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ABSTRACT
This thesis is devoted to exploring anthropocentrism, the concept of human-centredness, as 
it relates to humans, animals, and education. Employing the philosophical research method of 
conceptual analysis and working with a five-part theoretical framework (Chapter 1), I explore 
anthropocentrism’s meanings, manifestations, and rationalizations (Chapter 2), discuss three 
bodies of theory—animal liberation/animal rights, ecofeminism, and poststructuralism—that help 
to illuminate it (Chapter 3), consider the connections between anthropocentrism and education 
(Chapter 4), and outline potential educational responses to anthropocentrism (Chapter 5). Through 
these chapters my intention is to demonstrate that anthropocentrism is a serious bias that deserves 
critical educational attention, both for the sake of students and the sake of all other animals with 
whom we share the planet.
i
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This thesis evolved from my interest in exploring the concept of anthropocentrism—  
human-centredness or, as I explore in this research, the mindset of human superiority over 
animals1— and outlining why I think anthropocentrism should be considered critically in education. 
Through an anthropocentric mindset humans are often seen as the only beings with true value or 
importance, and animals are subsequently disregarded or evaluated only in terms of their 
usefulness to humans. This mindset, and the ways it may be reproduced in education or conversely 
challenged there, is the focus of this thesis.
I entitle this thesis The Human-Animal Divide to reflect the divide that humans often hold 
in their minds that keeps animals fixed as “others,” as beings considered inferior and/or less 
worthy than humans of moral consideration. In western culture, the categories o f human and 
animal are often polarized, despite the fact that humans are animals, and the fact that many 
scientists, dating back to Darwin (1871/1976), understand the differences between humans and 
other animals as ones of degree rather than kind. It is therefore more accurate to conceptualize 
humans and animals as being on a continuum rather than occupying separate camps from each 
other, but the notion of a clear divide between humans and animals remains deeply rooted and is 
expressed in myriad ways, as I explore in the first half of this thesis.
What keeps this divide in place, I believe, is anthropocentrism. It is anthropocentrism that 
supports the conclusion that humans are the most valuable species on the planet, and it is 
anthropocentrism that reinforces the divide whereby humans, standing on one side of the
1 I use the term “animal” in the conventional sense to mean “other-than-human animal.” I recognize, however, that it 
is a problematic term, as it separates humans from other animals and erases the fact that humans are animals, too. I use 
this term in the interest of readability, not to reinforce the human-animal divide I am discussing. I discuss the semantic 
challenges o f the word “animal” further in Chapter 2.
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conceptual line, are considered moral entities while all other animals are relegated to the other side 
as beings who rarely count in their own right. As Singer (1975) notes, through an anthropocentric 
lens animals’ interests seem “allowed to count only when they do not clash with human interests”
(p. 220).
The more I contemplate this human-animal divide, the more I see it as disconcerting and 
false. The tendency to assign moral worthiness to humans on the grounds of their species is a bias, 
a parochial way of seeing the (human) world in exclusion of all other living beings. This bias 
troubles me, especially when I consider its outcomes for all those who fall outside its conceptual 
boundaries—in particular, animals. It troubles me that a particular way of seeing/being in the 
world results in a disregard for many animals’ well-being, and it concerns me that humans 
perpetuate a viewpoint that is neither scientifically valid nor, in my opinion, ethically appropriate. 
Given the enormous scope and consequences of this divide, I see anthropocentrism as a matter 
worthy of examination.
One of the places I think it is especially worthy of examination is education—and hence 
the second part of this thesis and its subtitle, Anthropocentrism and Education. It is my opinion 
that the educational system, with its focus on individuals’ intellectual and moral development, has 
a role to play in unpacking anthropocentrism; as I argue in the latter half of this thesis the 
reproduction of the anthropocentric bias seems contrary to what might be considered the purpose(s) 
of education itself. As such, I think it is worthwhile to examine the relationship between 
anthropocentrism and education from various angles, including how education reproduces the 
anthropocentric status quo, why education is an appropriate venue for considering 
anthropocentrism critically, and how this might be approached. I explore these ideas in Chapters 4 
and 5.
This thesis, then, delves into what I have come to think of as the “human-animal divide” 
that characterizes the mindset of anthropocentrism, and considers how education relates to, and 
might respond to, this conceptual rift.
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Philosophical Approach
In the end, the hope of philosophy is to understand—understand ourselves, understand our 
world, understand our values and the entirety o f existence around us. (Cline, 2006, U 11)
This thesis is philosophical in nature, and in keeping with the above quote aims to 
contribute to understanding—specifically, understanding of the concepts of anthropocentrism, 
education, and the relationship between the two. Adams (2000) suggests philosophy is concerned 
with examining the everyday, with “bringing under critical review and appraisal as much as 
possible of what is ordinarily taken for granted, assumed, or presupposed about experience”
(p. 352). This thesis reflects that focus as I review some “ordinarily taken-for-granted” notions 
surrounding humans, animals, and education. In Chapter 2 I explore dominant understandings of 
“human” and “animal,” and in Chapters 4 and 5 I consider what might be taken-for-granted 
assumptions about how animals are represented in education.
These explorations are nested within my larger philosophical claim: that education should 
critically examine the anthropocentric status quo. This claim situates my work in the philosophy of 
education, defined by Hare and Portelli (2001) as a “critical inquiry into educational concepts, 
values, and practices, the reflections of which offer an important bearing on practical educational 
decisions” (p. 11). This thesis reflects these tenets as it engages with concepts (anthropocentrism 
and education), values (especially those surrounding human-animal relations), and practices (in 
particular, educational practices that connect to understandings of human-animal relations), and in 
doing so, outlines implications for educational theory and practice.
Guiding Research Questions
Several research questions emerged from my study. In particular, the questions of “what is 
anthropocentrism?” “what is the purpose of education?” and “why should education challenge 
anthropocentrism?” were explored, as were several sub-questions that emerged from them. The
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What am I researching? How will I conduct my research? What are my theoretical 





Meanings: How is anthropocentrism defined and understood? What elements appear 
in its definitions, and how are those elements defined? How do I define it? 
Manifestations: What are the results of anthropocentrism? What are its consequences 
for animals? for humans?




How do three bodies of theory—animal liberation/animal rights, ecofeminism, and 




What is the relationship between education and anthropocentrism? Why should a 
philosophy of education consider anthropocentrism critically, and how might the 
study of anthropocentrism fit into a critical pedagogy context?
Chapter 5:
Educational Responses to 
Anthropocentrism
What educational responses exist to anthropocentrism? How might education disrupt 
or challenge anthropocentrism? Where might the critical consideration of 
anthropocentrism fit into the curriculum?
Figure 1: Research questions and design.
Research Method
The research method that guided this work is conceptual analysis, a philosophical method 
involving the analysis of concepts. A concept can be understood as “an idea or thought, more 
precisely the abstraction that represents or signifies the unifying principle of various distinct 
particulars” (Barrow & Milbum, 1986, p. 47), or, more simply, as “a general notion, an abstract 
idea” (Oxford Canadian Dictionary, 2006, p. 190), and analysis can be understood as a process of 
exploring a concept deeply by “comparing apparent opposites, comparing distinct concepts th a t... 
belong in the same domain,... considering border line cases,... and searching for necessary and 
sufficient conditions” (Barrow & Milbum, 1986, p. 18). Bringing these definitions together, 
conceptual analysis can be understood as a research method that involves considering the criteria 
that defines an idea, including its likeness and opposition to other ideas.
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Conceptual analysis involves “philosophic analyses of concepts or ideas or proposals or 
claims” (Brandon, 1983, ]f 1), whereby the researcher considers “the meaningfulness and 
inter-relationships of the concepts involved... to derive a clearer understanding of the fundamental 
concepts” (Centre for Fundamental and Anomalies Research, n.d, If 1). Exploring concepts— in the 
case of this research, the concepts of anthropocentrism and education—connects to the 
philosophical project of reviewing assumptions and ideas ordinarily taken for granted; it also 
distinguishes this research method from other forms of research. In conceptual research the focus 
is not as much on finding “answers” as might be the case in more traditional forms of research, but 
rather is on opening up a concept intellectually by engaging in a careful philosophical 
consideration of it (Wilson, 1963).
Part of conducting a conceptual analysis involves considering others’ ideas about the 
concepts under scrutiny. According to the International Association for Dance Medicine and 
Science (2003), “conceptual analyses are often built around a review of the research literature 
related to the concept under consideration” flf 1). As such, a significant part of conceptual research 
involves investigating ideas about a concept and then synthesizing and extending those ideas. In 
accordance with this, a considerable part of my research involved familiarizing myself with 
materials on the topics o f anthropocentrism and education, and applying their salient ideas to my 
research questions.
Another part of conceptual research involves finding relevant examples to explore a 
concept (Wilson, 1963). In my work, those “relevant examples” are often animals themselves, and 
I have included some photos and representations of them in this thesis. I have done this for three 
reasons: first, in some cases the photos relate directly to what I am discussing, and in regard to the 
adage of a picture being worth a thousand words, I included them to exemplify my points. Second, 
my aim was to give conceptual space and consideration to both humans and animals in this 
research, and I found that including photos of animals was one way of giving animals that space 
and consideration. My third reason for incorporating photos of animals was because in writing this
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thesis I wanted to move away from producing a text-only document that might reaffirm the 
primacy accorded to the written (human) word—as discussed in Chapter 2, this primacy is often 
taken as evidence of humans’ “superiority” over animals, and I felt that including photos of 
animals might, in a small way, disrupt this mindset, as well as encourage engagement with animals 
on a less abstract level.
Theoretical Influences
As an Education student with a specialization in Women’s Studies, I have gained exposure 
to several bodies of theory that have influenced my thinking. From Education, the fields of 
educational philosophy and critical pedagogy influence me, and from Women’s Studies I have 
gained exposure to ecofeminist and poststructuralist thought. On my own I have explored animal 
liberation/animal rights theory, which I find compelling from an ethical perspective. These five 
areas—animal liberation/animal rights, ecofeminism, poststructuralism, critical pedagogy, and 
educational philosophy—form the basis of my theoretical framework, and I explore these bodies 
of theory in relation to the concepts of anthropocentrism and education (see Figure 2).
Anthropocentrism <---------------► Education
animal liberation/ critical educational
rights theory pedagogy philosophy
— ecofeminism
— poststructuralism
Figure 2: Theoretical framework.
I am influenced by animal liberation/animal rights theory and its argument that animals are 
entities who possess intrinsic value and are deserving of moral attention. On a personal level I find 
the animal liberation/animal rights argument that humans should not use animals for their own
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ends compelling, although presented as a universal ethic it is somewhat problematic. Nonetheless, 
I find that this discourse, more than any other field of thought, critically considers the power 
imbalances in human-animal relations and raises poignant ethical questions about them. In doing 
so it offers valuable perspectives on anthropocentrism, which I explore in Chapter 3.
Ecofeminism influences me most prominently through its theme of breaking down binaries 
and moving beyond dualisms. Gaard (1998) explains that ecofeminism strives to disentangle itself 
from the western tradition of hierarchical dualisms (e.g., men vs. women, humans vs. animals, 
culture vs. nature, objectivity vs. subjectivity, rationality vs. emotionality), as these dualisms are 
understood as reinscribing inequities. Ecofeminists suggest traditional “either/or” thinking be 
replaced by a “both/and” mentality (Plumwood, 1993), and I have attempted to approach this 
perspective in my research by focusing, for example, on both humans and animals, both nature and 
culture, both reason and emotion, and so on. In this way, I aimed to not favour or accord 
epistemological primacy to any one “side” of a dualism.
A second way that ecofeminism, and feminism in general, influences me is through its 
understanding of the importance of a researcher “locating” herself within her writing. As 
Ardovini-Brooker (2002) writes, a hallmark of the feminist approach is that “the researchers’ 
intellectual autobiography must be taken into consideration” and the researcher should position 
herself as “an active presence, an agent in research, and she constructs ... a viewpoint” (pp. 2-3). In 
feminist research it is argued that the knowledge produced should be situated as emerging from 
one’s particular culture, position within the culture, experiences, and worldviews; the researcher 
should not attempt to emulate an objective “voice from nowhere” (Haraway, 1991).
In relation to this, I have aimed to be explicit about where I am coming from in this thesis, 
and I have drawn on my experiences, in part, to inform my work. As a white, able-bodied, 
educated woman with middle-class status in western culture, I am aware that my “location” affords 
me a particular perspective in relation to this topic, as well as the time, energy, and resources 
required to undertake this research. My undergraduate degree in Women’s Studies has been
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especially helpful in allowing me to “see” anthropocentrism and animal oppression, as it opened 
my eyes to various forms of human oppression, conflated with gender, and the often-insidious 
workings of power that render that oppression seemingly “natural.” Extending some of these ideas 
to animals, as I have done in this thesis, has in no small part been an act of building upon the 
conceptual and cultural understandings I have gained through a feminist education. I explore these 
(eco)feminist influences in Chapter 3.
Poststructuralism influences me in the manner in which it calls into question concepts that 
may otherwise be treated as “natural” or “true” (Scott, 1988). In relation to humans, animals, and 
anthropocentrism, I believe there is much to be called into question, and the poststructuralist 
project can assist with this. I am particularly influenced by poststructuralism’s understanding of 
language as a system through which meaning is constructed and cultural practices organized, and 
how this might relate to human-animal relations. Within poststructuralism words are not believed 
to have fixed or intrinsic meanings (although certain meanings emerge as normative through 
power discourses (Foucault, 1980)), but rather are seen as constructs and constraints that can be 
deconstructed, in theory and practice. I explore these ideas further in Chapter 3.
Critical pedagogy influences me through some of its underlying tenets, especially the ideas 
that education is inherently political, that the aim of education should be to balance the goals of 
cultivating the intellect with fostering social change, and that critical pedagogues should aim to 
identify and resist the harmful effects of dominant power (Kincheloe, 2005). Through a critical 
pedagogy approach to education it is important to examine current ideologies and systems of 
power to determine who benefits, and who suffers, under them, as well as examining what counts 
as “knowledge” itself and what power relations are embedded in it. In Chapters 4 and 5 I consider 
knowledge and power in relation to education and anthropocentrism, and a critical pedagogy 
perspective guides these chapters.
Finally, educational philosophy influences me through its questioning of the purposes of 
education, the role education plays (or should play) in students’ development, and how education
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connects to critical and/or creative thinking. In particular, I am drawn to the philosophical idea that 
education should not be about reproducing the cultural status quo, but rather should comprise a 
critical inquiry that opens up new possibilities for thinking about and being in the world. In 
Chapters 4 and 5 I discuss ideas from the philosophy of education that connect to my research, and 
throughout this thesis I am influenced by this field as it provides a framework for my own work, in 
which I am forwarding my own philosophy of education.
Potential Audiences
This thesis is interdisciplinary in nature, and as such is aimed at an interdisciplinary 
audience. As explained in the section above, I have been influenced by, and have drawn ideas from, 
the fields of educational philosophy, critical pedagogy, ecofeminism, poststructuralism, and 
animal rights/animal liberation theory. I believe each of these areas has a stake in analyzing 
anthropocentrism, and as such, this research may be of interest to anyone in these fields. This 
thesis is thus aimed at a wide potential audience, including students, teachers, researchers, 
philosophers, ethicists, animal defense and social justice scholars and activists, and anyone else 
interested in considering the concept of anthropocentrism and the human-animal divide.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Anthropocentrism: Meanings, Manifestations, and Rationalizations
In this chapter and the next I analyze the concept of anthropocentrism so that it is 
understood in the context of my larger claim, that anthropocentrism is a bias that should be 
considered in education instead of being ignored (and hence reproduced) there. This chapter 
provides the first half of this analysis by exploring some of anthropocentrism’s meanings, 
including my own understanding of the term; some of its manifestations for animals and humans; 
and some of the ways it may be rationalized or kept in place.
Meanings o f Anthropocentrism
The initial question about... technical terms is ... “What does this term mean?” (Barrow &
Milbum, 1986, p. 4)
For a few reasons, it makes sense to begin my analysis of anthropocentrism by considering 
some definitions of the term. Outlining definitions serves the obvious purpose of introducing 
readers to meanings of the term, and it also provides an opportunity to consider how different 
authors interpret it, what components they understand as comprising it, and how they see those 
components fitting together. It is also worthwhile to review definitions because after having done 
so I will be in a position to forward my own operational definition of the term, which can be then 
be carried through the rest of the thesis.
Breaking down the word anthropocentrism produces two word stems: anthro (meaning, 
relating to humans, as in anthropology) and centrism (meaning, central). Putting these ideas back 
together, the notion of “humans at the centre” or “human-centred” is evoked, and this notion is 
indeed at the core of many definitions of the term. Figure 3 outlines some definitions, taken from a
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variety of sources.
Definitions of Anthropocentrism (listed alphabetically by author)
• “a human-centred perspective” (Adams & Donovan, 1999, p. 4)
• “our vested interests in the prospects of our own kind”; “any moral perspective which takes the human 
case to be central or paradigmatic” (Benton, 1993, p. 75)
• “any view magnifying the importance of humans in the cosmos, e.g., by seeing it as created for our 
benefit” (Blackburn, 2005, p. 17)
• “the attitude that humans are the most important thing in the universe” (Brute Ethics, 2006, n.p.)
• “placing humanity and human interests at the center of value” (Katz, 1997, p. 122)
• (anthropocentric): “regarding human beings as the centre of existence” (Oxford Canadian Dictionary,
2006, p. 32)
• “stopping [our] frameworks [of morality and rationality] at the human species boundary” (Plumwood,
1997, p. 328)
• “human chauvinism: the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all values, the measure 
of all things” (Seed, 2000, f  1)
• “the ‘human superiority complex’ considering humans as superior to or the pinnacle of all forms of life”
(Smith, n.d., 2)
• “the view that humans are primary and central in the order of things” (Steiner, 2005, p. 1)
• “the “human-centred principle, referfing] to the idea that humanity must always remain the central
concern for humans. According to anthropocentrism, all things in the universe are to be judged in their 
relationship to man [sic]... other life forms ... are only important as much as they affect people”
(Wikipedia, 2006a, ^ 1-2)
Figure 3: Definitions of anthropocentrism.
Some themes emerge upon reviewing the above definitions. First, the word human appears 
in every definition, which identifies anthropocentrism as clearly relating to humans. It could 
further be said that anthropocentrism relates almost exclusively to humans, since other living 
beings are referenced in only two of the definitions (Smith, n.d.; Wikipedia, 2006a) and in both 
instances they are referenced only to underscore that these “others” are subordinated to humans
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
12
through an anthropocentric worldview.
A second theme that emerges is that anthropocentrism relates to a frame of mind or a 
mental framework in general: it involves a “principle” (Wikipedia, 2006a), a “view” (Blackburn, 
2005; Steiner, 2005), an “attitude” (Brute Ethics, 2006), or a “perspective” (Adams & Donovan, 
1999; Benton, 1993)—words that suggest a particular way of thinking. One definition refers to 
anthropocentrism as an “idea” (Seed, 2000), and this too evokes the notion of a mental process. 
Anthropocentrism therefore refers to a frame of mind involving humans, and evoked by humans as 
well.
A third theme that emerges is that this principle/view/attitude/perspective/idea relates to 
the importance of humans: humans are “central/at the centre/as the centre” (Benton, 1993; Katz, 
1997; Oxford Canadian Dictionary, 2006; Steiner, 2005; Wikipedia, 2006a), “paradigmatic” 
(Benton, 1993), “the crown of creation, the source of all values, the measure of all things” (Seed, 
2000), “primary” (Steiner, 2005), the “most important... in the universe” (Brute Ethics, 2006), 
and “the pinnacle of all forms of life” (Smith, n.d.). Thus, through anthropocentrism humans are 
considered to be of the utmost importance—more important than other living beings, and possibly 
the only beings of moral importance at all.
These three themes form the basis of anthropocentrism: it applies to humans, it refers to a 
mindset, and it suggests that humans are the most worthy species on the planet. Putting these ideas 
together, we could arrive at a definition of anthropocentrism as a perspective whereby humans are 
considered the most valuable o f all living beings, but I am not satisfied that this definition is 
complete. What it is missing, from my perspective, is mention of anthropocentrism’s outcomes for 
other living beings—beings who are, as a result, pushed outside the boundaries of moral 
consideration, or viewed only in terms of their usefulness to humans. Those beings, as I am 
considering in this thesis, are animals.2
A more comprehensive review of the term might also include nature itself, e.g., trees, plants, waters, rocks, etc.
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I think it is worthwhile to consider the outcomes of anthropocentrism for humans and 
animals because both are impacted significantly by anthropocentrism, and because the conceptual 
human-animal divide that is a prominent characteristic of the anthropocentric mindset leaves both 
parties “positioned” under it, for better or for worse. Given that both humans and animals are 
impacted significantly by anthropocentrism, I think a more inclusive definition of the term should 
mention its meanings for humans and animals3 and acknowledge that the “humans at the centre” 
attitude also results in one of “animals at the fringes.”
One activist organization that appears to agree with this assessment is Animal Liberation 
Front (ALF), which offers the following definition of anthropocentrism:
Anthropocentrism
1. The belief that the only species that matters, has feelings, has interests, and has rights is the human one.
2. The belief that everything that exists on Earth belongs to humans, to do with as we will, for our own 
benefit and pleasure.
3. The absolute failure to recognize that animals have the right to exist on Earth without being 
commercialized and commodified for the comfort of humans.
4. The misguided perception that humans are the only species o f import on the planet, rather than just one 
among many who have intrinsic value and who contribute to the equilibrium and beauty of the Earth.
5. The refusal to acknowledge that animals are sentient, conscious beings who are capable of suffering 
physically and psychologically and who value their lives, their homes, their mates, and their children.
6. The inability to see that all life is interconnected and interdependent—and that a sense of connection 
with and respect for animals enriches and enhances our own lives.
7. A profound sense of disconnection from nature and other life forms—with an attendant callous 
disregard for their wellbeing and the consequent erosion of our own characters, (n.d., Tj 1-7)
Figure 4: ALF’s definition of anthropocentrism.
3 Ironically, it could be said that a definition of anthropocentrism that excludes animals is, in itself, perpetuating 
anthropocentrism!
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In my assessment, ALF’s definition somewhat overstates the case, as I am not convinced 
that all of the facets outlined in the seven-part definition need to be held for a person or a viewpoint 
to be considered anthropocentric. For example, a person could believe that animals have feelings 
and are capable of suffering, but at the same time not care about their feelings or their suffering, 
and this would, I believe, position that person as anthropocentric. Similarly, a person could believe 
that animals make a contribution to the “equilibrium and beauty of the Earth” (as discussed in 
point 4) but still not accord them moral consideration, and this too would position their perspective 
in the realm of anthropocentrism. I therefore think ALF’s definition is an overstatement, but at the 
same time I think it offers a valuable perspective concerning the outcomes of 
anthropocentrism—specifically, that it is characterized by a disregard for animal life, and that it 
involves a corresponding disconnect from animals on the part of humans. These ideas are relevant 
to the meaning of the term, as I will explore in the “Manifestations of Anthropocentrism” section 
of this chapter.
Having now reviewed some definitions of anthropocentrism, considered their salient 
themes, and outlined my own thoughts that animals warrant mention within an inclusive definition 
of the term, I offer an operational definition of anthropocentrism for this thesis: it is a perspective 
whereby humans are considered the most valuable of all living beings and animals are 
excluded from the sphere of moral consideration. I think this definition is more satisfactorily 
inclusive, but it requires further unpacking still as the categories of “human” and “animal” are 
themselves complex and unstable.
Troubling the binary: What does it mean to be “human?” to be “animal?”
Conventional understandings of the words human (meaning, homo sapien) and animal 
(meaning, any animal except a human) demonstrate how the “divide” mentality has crept into (or 
originated from?) the English language. These conventional understandings suggest a clear
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demarcation between humans and animals; more so, they suggest that humans are not animals. 
Linguistically and conceptually, they separate humans from all other animals.
Interestingly, this separation is both supported by and contradicted by dictionary 
definitions of the terms “human” and “animal.” The Oxford Canadian Dictionary (2006), for 
example, offers the following definitions for the word human'.
1. of, belonging to, or characteristic of people or humankind. 2. consisting of human beings.
3. of or characteristic of humankind as opposed to God, animals, or machines... 4. showing 
(esp. the better) qualities of humankind, e.g., kindness, compassion, e tc .... n. a human 
being, esp. as distinguished from an animal, (p. 474)
According to these definitions, human can be understood as being “opposed to ... animals” 
and “distinguished from an animal,” but this becomes problematic upon considering the same 
dictionary’s definition of animal:
1. a living organism which feeds on organic matter, usu. one with specialized sense organs 
and nervous system, and able to respond rapidly to stimuli. 2. such an organism other than 
man. 3. a brutish or uncivilized person. 4. informal a person or thing of any kind (there is 
no such animal), (p. 30)
The problem that becomes apparent upon considering these definitions is that the word 
animal both encompasses humans (as reflected in definitions 1,3, and 4) and excludes humans 
(definition 2) at the same time. This leaves open two questions: (1) Are humans animals? and (2) 
Does animal encompass human? Paradoxically, the answer to both of these questions could be yes 
or no, depending on which parts of the definitions are considered. The result, then, is semantic 
confusion: while biologically humans are animals, from a linguistic perspective “human” and 
“animal” can also be considered, quite legitimately, as excluding each other.
To trouble this binary even further, there is also the tendency for humans to linguistically 
dichotomize the “human” and the “animal” within themselves. A person may, for example, be said
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to be acting like an “animal” if he or she is not acting in a “rational” manner (as reflected in the 
third definition of animal above), or a person’s sexual or aggressive energy may be understood as 
his or her “animal instincts.” In this instance, the human/animal binary appears to work in concert 
with the mind/body binary, for what is considered “human” is associated with the mind, while 
what is considered “animal” is associated with the body.4 Perhaps it can be said from this that 
humans both recognize and deny their membership in the animal community through the 
dichotomization of themselves via language: their “rational” side is “human”; their “primal” or 
“bodily” side, “animal.”
The word “animal” comes from anima, the Latin term for “breath” or “life” (Kemerling, 
2006). The concepts of breath and life, being characteristics that all living beings share, would 
seem to erase any conceptual divide between humans and animals and suggest that anima (and 
hence animal) encompasses human. Nonetheless, despite these original meanings of the word and 
their implications, English-speaking people have used the English language to define themselves 
outside of the animal order5—although, this defining has occurred in the context of a binary that 
appears to be in contradiction with itself.
To work around these semantic contradictions, I offer a more technically precise 
definition of anthropocentrism, as a perspective whereby humans are considered the most valuable 
of all living beings, and other-than-human animals are excluded from the sphere of moral 
consideration.
Manifestations o f Anthropocentrism
As a mindset or perspective, anthropocentrism is manifested mentally by humans and
4
A third binary at work here is the man/woman binary, with human/mind/man in one camp and animal/body/woman 
in the other (see Jones, 2004). I explore this idea further in Chapter 3.
This is not solely a phenomenon of English-speaking people; similar linguistic paradoxes exist in the French 
language, for example, and anthropocentric attitudes exist in various cultures.
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expressed through their actions and behaviours. It is a perspective both conceived of and acted 
upon, and it may be manifested at an individual level and a cultural level. There are therefore 
multiple locations through which anthropocentrism may be manifested, and countless ways it may 
be expressed.
Given this reality, it is not possible for me to provide a comprehensive overview of 
anthropocentrism’s manifestations. I offer, instead, a very broad review of some of its dominant 
expressions, and for more in-depth consideration of the ideas presented I reference other authors as 
appropriate.
Manifestations for animals.
Through an anthropocentric lens it may be argued that considering the consequences of 
anthropocentrism for animals is in itself moot: if  animals do not count, morally speaking, then why 
consider them in the first place? It may be further suggested that since animals are not worthy of 
moral consideration, humans can (and perhaps should) use them in every conceivable way, and 
that any suffering endured by animals as a result of these usages is perhaps unfortunate, but in no 
way morally wrong.6
I believe it is worthwhile to consider anthropocentrism’s manifestations for animals for 
three reasons: (1) because they are living, feeling beings who demonstrate their own life interests, 
(2) because they comprise a significant “party” within the relationship that humans hold with the 
world, and (3) because an analysis of animals’ experiences provides a richer understanding of the 
concept of anthropocentrism. To ignore the manifestations of anthropocentrism for animals is to
6 As D ’Silva (2006) states: “If you take the traditional, anthropocentric view ... although some ... situations might be 
regrettable in terms of animal suffering, they are necessary in order to supply our own species with food, fun, 
adornment, medicine, a livelihood or just plain profit” (p. 273).
I assume this statement holds an evident truth, as the question of animal sentience has long been proven. While 
animals demonstrate differing levels of sentience, it is my experience that observing carefully or getting to know an 
animal reveals that they are individuals with their own personalities and preferences.
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turn a blind eye toward them (and hence to reproduce the anthropocentric status quo), and this is 
not the intention of my research.
As previously discussed, anthropocentrism is a perspective that translates into actions and 
behaviours, and it is these actions and behaviours that have direct consequences for animals (as 
arguably, our thoughts alone do not affect animals in any direct ways, other than by the means they 
translate into actions). As such, I limit my discussion here to some examples of anthropocentric 
actions and behaviours that manifest upon animals in western culture.
Intensive farming. Adams (1995) suggests the most common way western individuals 
may interact with animals is by eating them: the average North American consumes animal parts 
with every meal and will consume, in her or his lifetime, an average of “984 chickens, 37 turkeys, 
29 pigs, 12 cattle, 2 lambs, 1 calf, and more than 1,000 fish” (p. 26). While land-based “food” 
animals may be procured through traditional-style family farms or hunting, the majority, in 
western culture, are raised in intensive farming situations. In the United States, for example, 99 
percent of chickens kept for egg-laying purposes, 72 percent of all pigs, and more than half of all 
cows are intensively farmed in what some industry representatives call “full confinement systems” 
(Robbins, 2001).
Intensive farming demonstrates the anthropocentric notion that animals are not worthy of 
moral consideration, as the animals housed in these conditions are denied fulfillment of some of 
their most basic instincts, including the instinct to move around, to form social bonds, to procure 
their own food, to create their own homes, to live outdoors, and to raise their own offspring 
(Mason & Singer, 1980; Montgomery, 2000). In an effort to maximize profit, the animals are often 
raised in cages or stalls so small they may be unable to turn around or take a single step: chickens 
may be housed in cages with less than a square foot of floor space per bird (see Figure 5), pigs may 
be kept in “gestation” crates barely larger than their own bodies (see Figure 6), and dairy cows may
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spend their lives in concrete stalls, tethered at the neck. These animals, numbered easily in the 
millions in North America, are raised in large warehouses with little to no stimulation, and many 
never see the light of day (Robbins, 2001).
Not surprisingly, intensively farmed
animals suffer physical pain and/or psychological
distress. Unable to exercise and often bred to be
abnormally large, many become crippled and/or
obese. Foot and leg sores are particularly
common among all types of intensively confined
animals, as bedding is often not provided and the 
Figure 5: Hens in battery cages.
Source: At Our Hands, 2006. animals must sit, stand, or lie on metal slats
(Regan, 2004). In addition, all confined animals
breathe in high levels of ammonia from the urine
and feces that collects below them, and this
commonly results in eye infections, breathing
problems, and illnesses such as pneumonia
(Robbins, 2001). Psychological problems are
evident as well; in response to the deprivation that
Figure 6: Pigs in gestation crates. characterizes their lives many animals exhibit
Source: The Farm Sanctuary, 2006.
stereotyped behaviours such as chewing the bars 
of their cages, thrashing back and forth, ongoing vocalizations, self-mutilation, and “sham 
chewing” (chewing the air) (Mason & Singer, 1980; Montgomery, 2000; Regan, 2004).
It is clear that animals raised in intensive farming situations are not being granted moral 
consideration. It is also clear that humans are conceptually at the centre of these confinement 
systems, having created them in the first place and having done so to fulfill their own interests. An 
anthropocentric bias permeates this type of farming, and this is particularly evident when it is
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considered that most humans do not need to consume animal products to survive (Physicians 
Committee for Responsible Medicine, 2005), rendering the animals’ suffering ultimately 
unnecessary.
Research. In Canada, approximately two million animals are used each year for research, 
divided among three categories: general research, educational use (e.g., for research or dissection), 
and product testing. Close to 90 percent of the animals used for research are rats, mice, fish, and 
fowl, and the other 10 percent are comprised of other 
mammals and birds as well as reptiles and amphibians 
(Canadian Council on Animal Care, n.d.). Most 
animals do not emerge from laboratories alive 
(Dunayer, 2004).
As a “subject,” an animal may be used in 
virtually any type of research deemed worthwhile to 
human interests, such as drug testing, experimental 
surgery, eye research, radiation research, brain research, 
aggression research, isolation research, studies of “learned 
helplessness,” stress research, military research, pain research, 
experiments where diseases or injuries are induced, vivisection, 
dissection, and experiments involving burning and skin 
irritation (Montgomery, 2000; Regan, 2004 - see Figures 7-8). 
Rohr (1989) adds to this list by noting that in psychological 
research “countless animals have been surgically dismembered, 
drugged, starved, fatigued, frozen, electrically shocked, infected, 
cross-bred, maddened, and killed in the belief that their 
behaviour ... would cast light on the nature of humankind”
Figure 7: Rabbits restrained for testing. 
Source: At Our Hands, 2006.
Figure 8: A research subject. 
Source: At Our Hands, 2006.
An exception to this are people in northern parts of the world, who rely on animals as their primary food source.
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(p. 57). One of the most common forms of animal research is toxicity testing, in which animals are 
forced to ingest, inhale, or have applied to their skin or eyes commercial products such as bleach, 
nail polish, perfume, and glue. These tests, while not legally required, are conducted to give 
manufacturers legal cover in case a consumer is accidentally poisoned or harmed by the product 
(Regan, 2004).9
Like intensively farmed animals, animals used in research suffer physically and 
psychologically. Their use as research subjects reflects the anthropocentric bias whereby their 
lives are not considered morally important and, as such, may be compromised or ended to satisfy 
human curiosity and/or further human knowledge. Humans are clearly at the moral centre o f such 
research as it is almost always conducted for their benefit; in some cases the benefits themselves 
are questionable. In the case of drug testing, for example, cardiovascular specialist Pippin (2005) 
states that animal testing is moot because the results of such testing cannot reliably predict 
humans’ responses to the drugs10 (and at times the results of such animal tests have been 
devastating to human health: for example, the drug Thalidomide was deemed safe for human use 
on account of animal testing that produced no adverse results (Greek, n.d.)). Some suggest the 
benefits of animal testing are generally overstated given that the majority of the most important 
health advances have resulted from changes in hygiene and improvements in living conditions 
(Regan, 2004; Rohr, 1989); others note that more viable alternatives exist (e.g., live human cell 
research, in vitro research, and computer simulations) (Pippin, 2005). The value of subjecting 
animals to painful and/or distressing situations is also questionable when it is considered that, 
without any mandatory system for sharing protocols or experiment results, there is vast duplication 
of research and relatively few studies ever reach publication (Spiegel, 1996).
9
Toxicity tests are commonly known as LD-50 tests (LD standing for lethal dose). After 50 percent of the “test” 
animals die from toxicity, a company can reliably print on their product that it is harmful if ingested or otherwise 
improperly used. The company then has legal recourse if a person misuses a substance, becomes ill, and attempts to 
initiate a lawsuit (Regan, 2004).
For example, Aspirin killed six species of animals used to test the product, and saccharin killed all male rats used in 
testing, but both products are deemed safe for human use (Pippin, 2005). Greek (n.d.) states that scientists “are now 
going on record stating that there is only a 5-25% correlation between animals results and human results” 5).
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Entertainment. Countless animals are used for human entertainment, which may take the 
form of circuses, zoos, marine parks, rodeos, and racing events such as horse or greyhound racing. 
Animals objectified for these types of entertainment have the autonomy over their lives taken 
away, and many are forced to live in unnatural environments and/or perform unnatural behaviours 
for the satisfaction of the human gaze (see Figures 9-10). Since arguably no species of animal is 
exempt from being targeted for some human entertainment purpose, all animals are potential 
victims to these anthropocentric practices.
Many “entertainment” animals are also victim to physical abuse and/or deprivation, 
particularly those forced to perform for humans. For example, animals used in circuses (e.g., lions,
tigers, bears, elephants) may be assaulted with whips, 
metal bars, chains, electric prods, or even human 
fists to learn their tricks, and when they are not 
performing they spend their time in small cages 
and/or in transport to the next city (Masson & 
McCarthy, 1996). Many marine animals, such as 
dolphins, also suffer in myriad ways: from the 
trauma of being captured from sea and separated 
from their pod, from the deprivation in the tanks in 
which they live, and from possible mistreatment at 
the hands of trainers, who may deny them food until 
they “learn” to perform. The “bucking broncos” in 
rodeos are also subject to human cruelty, as the 
majority of these horses are not wild but rather may 
be “frightened and in pain” (Regan, 2004, p. 152) on 
account of the use of electric prods administered as 
they leave the chute, flank straps cinched tightly
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Figure 9: Bears in a circus. 
Source: At Our Hands, 2006.
Figure 10: Captive orca whale. 
Source: At Our Hands, 2006.
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near their abdominal regions, and/or spurs digging into their bodies from riders’ shoes (Masson & 
McCarthy, 1996; Regan, 2004, Singer, 1975). These performing animals’ suffering is, like that of 
the animals who are intensively farmed or used for research purposes, negated from consideration 
in favour of human interests.
The above examples barely scratch the surface of the manifestations of anthropocentrism 
for animals; much, much more could be written about each of these examples and many other 
topics could be considered as well, such as the use of animals for sport, clothing, ecotourism, 
exotic pets, etc. It is impossible to put numbers around the animals who suffer and die for human 
interests each year, although it is known that that number is in the billions.11 This demonstrates 
how, on a wide scale, the usage of animals in western culture is a normalized, hegemonic idea.
Kincheloe (2005) describes hegemony as a Gramscian term denoting concealed 
domination held by institutional powers, or a blanketing worldview that effectively becomes 
invisible on account of its ubiquitous, “normal” nature as promoted by the institutions themselves. 
The idea that animals do not count, morally speaking, is hegemonic because animals are used so 
widely in society. This is not to say all animals are victims of anthropocentrism, or all individuals 
and institutions are themselves anthropocentric, but the notion of animals as worthy of moral 
consideration is rejected in significant, institutionalized ways in western culture, which contributes 
to the hegemonic idea that humans are the only ones who morally count.
This idea is further represented by a legal system that grants rights to humans alone. 
Dunayer (2004) explains how in current law, animals are subsumed under humans as property: 
they are either considered personal property (e.g., a person is understood as “owning” animals 
such as a dog or cows; they are his or her personal property), or public property (e.g., free-living 
animals). Either way, animals are legally positioned as belonging to humans, and humans have the
Adams (2004) writes that for food sources alone, 31.1 billion animals die each year.
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power to decide their fate. This is, in the end, what anthropocentrism means for animals: they exist 
for humans, and they are not granted autonomy over their own lives.
Manifestations for humans.
If animals are the “losers” under anthropocentrism, then humans are clearly the “winners” 
or the ones who benefit from it. Unlike animals, humans are considered moral agents, and they are 
granted legal status as such under the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. The Charter 
provides each person with the assurance of basic rights and freedoms, including “legal rights: the 
right to life, liberty and personal security” (Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, 2006, f  3). 
These rights are granted to all persons regardless of sex, race, ethnicity, mental or physical 
capacity, age, etc.; as such, humans are legally considered beings with their own intrinsic worth, 
granted to them on account of their membership in the human community. In some significant 
ways, being the “winners” of anthropocentrism results in humans gaining basic rights and 
freedoms on account of their species.
There is also a downside to anthropocentrism for humans, however, as the parochial vision 
that accompanies this perspective may result in a short-sightedness that can limit a person’s 
worldview and her or his ability to connect, both with herself/himself and with other species. For 
example, as previously discussed, anthropocentrism may result in a disconnect from seeing 
oneself as a member of the animal community, or it may lead to semantic or conceptual confusion 
as to whether humans are animals, and where the boundaries between human and animal are 
drawn. More deeply, that confusion can lead to us thinking that we are, as humans, somehow 
outside the animal order and more “special” than other species. As Best (2003) notes: “The tragic 
flaw in the human species is its historical need to define itself as not only radically different from 
all other species, but also as infinitely greater and more advanced” flf 13). This “tragic flaw” 
reflects a chronic misinterpretation of evolutionary theory, which considers all animals to be
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evolutionarily netted together, and it also seems to deny the ecological perspective that all life on 
earth is bound in a web of mutual interdependence (Darwin, 1871/1976).
Anthropocentrism may also lead to a disengagement from other animals, or, as ALF’s 
definition put it, “a profound sense of disconnection from nature and other life forms” (n.d., 7). 
The insistence on humanity’s moral superiority may lead to an inability to appreciate the 
conceptual “other”; it may also lead to a denial or refusal to acknowledge that humans and animals 
have a great deal in common. For example, animals share with humans many life patterns and 
experiences that accompany those life stages; all animals feel emotions and physical sensations to 
varying degrees; all animals sleep; all animals demonstrate preferences; and all animals can suffer 
(Balcombe, 2006; Singer, 1975). Perhaps more generally it can be said that all animals are, as 
Regan (2004) explains, “subjects-of-a-life” (p. 50), meaning all animals have some sort of 
consciousness dwelling inside their bodies, and all animals care about what happens to them, 
regardless of whether anyone else cares or not. To put this another way, all animals experience 
what Evemden (1985) calls an “interrelation of self and world” (p. 81).
The inability or unwillingness to acknowledge animals as beings worthy of moral 
consideration leads to humans adopting the role of the oppressor. Refusing to acknowledge 
animals as having intrinsic worth may lead to humans rationalizing animal suffering as either 
unimportant or non-existent, and in doing so we arguably degrade ourselves. As Kant (1785/1996) 
wrote, we demean ourselves when we demean animals, and our cruelty toward them taints the 
name of human: “[VJiolent and cruel treatment of animals is ... intimately opposed to a human 
being’s duty to himself [sic], and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of 
their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very 
serviceable to morality” (pp. 192-193). By acting as the oppressor we turn away from a more 
compassionate side of our nature; further, as Kant expressed, cruelty toward animals may lead to 
cruelty toward other human beings.
In the English language, anthropocentrism manifests itself in disparaging animal
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metaphors. Animal names are often evoked in negative ways—as previously discussed, humans 
may conceptually dichotomize their “human” (read “rational”) and “animal” (read “bodily”) 
natures; they may also move animals into positions where they become symbols of evil, as 
evidenced by Freudians or philosophers who speak of a “beast within” (Midgley, 1978). Humans 
further disparage animals by making the term “animal” an insult, and the names of many species 
also function as insulting human labels: chicken suggests a person who is afraid, dog suggests a 
person who is ugly, cow suggests a woman who is overweight, rat suggests a person who betrays 
another person, bitch suggests a selfish or pushy woman Jackass suggests a stupid man,/ox 
suggests either a deceiving person or a “trophy” woman, snake suggests an unscrupulous man, pig  
suggests a chauvinistic male or a person who overeats, and so on. Dunayer (1995) notes that while 
these pejorative meanings are not intrinsic to the nature of the animals themselves, they often 
become attached to the animals and contribute to their oppression. As for humans, such metaphors 
perpetuate a linguistic system that promotes false stereotypes about animals’ natures.
In general, then, even though we, as humans, benefit from anthropocentrism, we are also 
hampered by it because it imposes limits around our self-understanding, our ability to connect with 
other species, the enactment of our own humanity, and the accuracy of the English language. More 
generally, it is a narrow way of understanding the world and one that requires that any 
contradictory evidence regarding animals’ worthiness be ignored or repressed. By insisting that 
humans are the sole moral entities on the planet, much richness of vision is surely being lost. 
Einstein labelled this limiting worldview an “optical delusion,” and suggested humans should 
strive to break from it:
A human being is part of the whole, called by us ‘Universe,’ [but] he [sic] experiences 
himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest, a kind of optical 
delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us ... our task must be to 
free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living 
creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. (Einstein, cited in Wilber, 2000, p. 136)
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Rationalizations o f Anthropocentrism
Why is anthropocentrism rationalized? If it is a biased way of thinking and a limiting 
worldview, why do many humans continue to subscribe to it and justify it? Two general 
possibilities suggest themselves: (1) it is the worldview we have inherited, and we accept it 
without question, and (2) humans benefit from it and therefore adhere to it.
The general adherence to anthropocentrism might be very different if humans were the 
“losers” under this perspective. If it were us who were being used for the purpose of another’s 
agenda, or us whose lives were severely hampered as a result of a dominant worldview or regime, 
we would likely feel very differently, and perhaps act out against our oppression as well.12 Acting 
out against oppressions is evidenced by the nature of social emancipation movements, which tend 
to emerge when a particular group of people are being discriminated against or are not being 
awarded equal rights. Hence, when people are subjugated there tends to be resistance, and on the 
flip side when there is no subjugation, it follows that there is no resistance,13 and efforts might 
even be extended to maintain the status quo. I think this is likely the case with anthropocentrism, as 
it is guarded and justified in various ways.
The quest for human uniqueness.
Some people have searched for a distinguishing characteristic that makes humans unique 
and that can be heralded as “proof’ of humans’ superiority. To this end, a final distinction has been 
sought to divide humans from animals and confer praise upon humanity, as well as provide a point 
upon which anthropocentrism can rest. Several “markers of humanity” have been proposed (see 
Figure 11).
12
A rather silly defense to the moral rightness of humans using animals is that since (a) groups rise up against 
oppression when it becomes intolerable and (b) animals, as a group, have not yet launched a “revolution,” then our 
treatment of the animals must be tolerable to the animals themselves. The validity o f this argument is quickly thrown 
into question when it is considered that most animals have virtually no defense against humans.
Although, a person may resist on behalf of another person or group or species.






morality awareness of mortality
Figure 11: Markers of humanity?
There are two general responses to this list. The first is acceptance that, in a variety o f ways, 
humans are unique and unparalleled. If we are looking for characteristics to separate ourselves as a 
group from animals we can certainly find some,14 but it does not follow that these characteristics 
mean we are “better” than other animals. It is illogical to choose human-centric characteristics and 
then hold them up as criteria for what makes humans superior (Noske, 1997). By this logic, any 
person could define what is “good” in relation to himself or herself, which is a selfish and biased 
way of thinking; we can see the unfairness of such thinking if we imagine the world was run by 
frogs, for example, and their criteria for exceptionalism and moral consideration was dependent 
upon how “frog-like” another being was.
A second response to the list is that some characteristics on it are shared by other animals in 
varying degrees. If we move outside a human framework, we see that many animals communicate 
using a “language” of sorts, although their language may be based on scent or vibration or songs 
rather than words (Bekoff, 2002). By the same token, all animals have their own version of 
rationality and intelligence—as Bekoff (2002) states: “[I]t is not very useful to ask if cats are 
smarter than dogs or chimpanzees are smarter than wolves, for each individual has to do what she 
or he needs to do in her or his own world” (p. xx). In some ways, then, the entire project of 
comparing humans to animals and attempting to extrapolate who is “higher” or “lower” (or “in” 
and “out”) in terms of abilities is pointless.
Nevertheless, there are some interesting examples of animals who demonstrate what were 
once thought of as exclusively human traits. Consider the following:
14 For example, as far as I know humans are the only species to cook their food.
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Tool usage: Woodpecker finches, who reside on the
Galapagos islands, use cactus spines as tools to pry grubs out
of trees. The finches have been observed to grasp cactus
spines in their beaks, shorten them if necessary by snapping
off parts to make more manageable “tools,” and then carry
them from branch to branch for reuse (Millikan & Bowman,
Figure 12: Tool-using finch. 1967) (see Figure 12).
© Tufts University, 2005.
Remembering the dead?: McComb, Baker, and Moss
(2006) note that African elephants seem to pay homage to the bones of their dead by gently
stroking them with their trunks and feet. In a study in
which elephants were presented with skulls from their
own species and skulls from other large mammals, the
elephants showed exclusive interest in the skulls of their
own kind and congregated around them, with some
elephants becoming highly agitated. This suggests
elephants can recognize the remains o f  their own kind, Figure 13: Elephants touching elephant skulls.
© Karen McComb/Royal Society.
years after death (see Figure 13).
Language—on human terms: Koko, a female lowland
gorilla bom in 1971, began learning American Sign
Language a year after she was bom. Today she has a
working vocabulary of more than 1000 signs, and
understands approximately 2000 words o f spoken English.
On average Koko signs sentences between three and six
words, and she uses sign language to express humour,
Figure 14: Koko, signing “stupid.” emotions, preferences, and imagination (Haraway, 1989;
© The Gorilla Foundation, 2007.
The Gorilla Foundation, 2006) (see Figure 14).
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Figure 15: Humpback whales. 
Source: NOAA, 2006.
Culture: Whale behaviour indicates that whales 
have what humans would call culture, as they learn 
from each other and pass on their learnings to other 
whales. Humpback whales, for example, sing songs to 
attract females or ward off other males, and these 
songs evolve over the course of a season. At the 
beginning of the season the whales sing one song, but 
the song changes a bit over the season so it is different by the end; in the course of a few years the 
song changes completely. Whales also express regional “dialects,” and there are dialects within 
each pod as well (Whitehead, 2004) (see Figure 15).
This microscopic glimpse into animal research suggests animal worlds may be much richer 
than we currently understand or previously imagined. It further suggests that the quest for human 
uniqueness may be a fruitless one, for who can name a single characteristic that is possessed by all 
humans but shared by no other animal?
Further rationalizations.
Beyond the quest for human uniqueness, various other rationalizations may be offered to 
defend anthropocentrism. One such rationalization is that it is innate; according to this perspective 
it is “natural” for humans to consider themselves most morally worthwhile, just as other species 
might, in turn, consider themselves or their kind most worthwhile. This type of reasoning may be 
followed by a hypothetical “lifeboat ethics” scenario—a situation in which a person must choose 
between saving the life of a human and saving the life of an animal.15 In such a scenario, if the 
person answers that she or he would save the human, then the anthropocentric bias is taken as 
innate. The problem with this rationalization is that it distorts the question about whether it is
15 For example, if you were in a lifeboat with one other person and a dog, and someone had to be thrown overboard or 
the lifeboat would sink, would you toss the human or the dog?
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“natural” for humans to deny moral consideration to animals, as it only presents a no-win (as well 
as abstract, decontextualized, and extraordinarily unlikely) situation in which one being, either a 
human or an animal, must be killed.16 This does not prove, however, that anthropocentrism is 
innate or that humans only care about other humans.
Related to this rationalization is the argument that since many animals do not accord moral 
consideration to each other (i.e., some animals kill other animals), then the “laws of nature” give 
humans the right to kill animals. Interestingly, this argument may be reliant upon the 
understanding that humans are animals, and suggest that because this is the case, humans should 
(at least in this scenario) act like animals too. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is in humans’ benefit to 
model their behaviour after animals in this scenario, whereas many other types of animal 
behaviour would not be considered appropriate to humans. This line of thinking may also ignore 
the fact that animals who kill other animals usually do so for survival (e.g., feeding), which cannot 
be said nearly as often about humans.
A third rationalization of anthropocentrism is that humans have a long history of 
disregarding animals and therefore this practice is natural and “right”; according to this 
perspective what has been done in the past can serve as a guide to the present. This argument loses 
strength when it is considered that tradition does not make for a reliable guide to moral rightness: 
there was a long history of human slavery, for example, and today this is considered immoral; 
similarly, women and Aboriginal people were once denied rights on the grounds of not being 
“persons,” and this too is now considered wrong. Thus, pointing to an anthropocentric past does 
not make the anthropocentric present natural or “right.”
In western culture, the positioning of humans at the centre of the moral universe is reflected 
in Christian ideology, making Christianity a possible rationalization for anthropocentrism. 
Christianity can be interpreted as supporting anthropocentrism through its depiction of a
16 Although, Bekoff (2002) recounts how some children, upon being presented with a similar scenario, came up with 
alternative responses such as everyone taking turns swimming alongside the lifeboat.
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human-like God, as reflected in the biblical idea that God made humanity in his [sic] own image 
{The Holy Bible, 1987, Genesis 1:27), thus promoting a connection between humanness and 
holiness. Anthropocentrism is also established in the creation story when God grants humanity 
dominion over all other creatures: after the flood, Noah thanks God by making burnt offerings “of 
every clean beast, and of every clean fowl” (Genesis 8:20), and in return God proclaims to Noah, 
“And the fear o f you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every 
fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea” (Genesis 
9:2-3). This marks the beginning of several biblical stories, in the Old Testament in particular, of 
humans sacrificing, slaughtering, and otherwise disregarding animals as a means of pleasing God, 
which may all be considered a rationalization for anthropocentrism. It must also be noted, however, 
that many biblical passages advocate compassion and kindness toward animals, and this 
complicates a singular perspective or ethic on the matter (Linzey & Yamamoto, 1998).
Philosophical and theological traditions may also be pointed to as a rationalization for 
anthropocentrism, as several philosophers and theologians addressed the question of what makes 
humans distinct from animals and came to anthropocentric conclusions. For example, Aristotle 
argued that animals exist to serve man [sic]; Kant wrote that animals are a means to an end and that 
end is man [sic]; Augustine argued that animals are not self-aware and are therefore inferior to 
self-aware humans; and Aquinas forwarded the idea that it is pointless to extend charity to animals 
because they are not rational creatures and the order of nature is for “irrational” beings to serve 
“rational” ones. Perhaps most famously, Descartes believed animals lacked souls and were 
therefore mechanisms, as opposed to beings, and as such he argued that humans did not owe them 
any consideration. These ideas contributed to an intellectual tradition influenced by 
anthropocentrism, although once again it must be noted that philosophers’ and theologians’ ideas 
were not uniformly anthropocentric (Preece, 2005; Steiner, 2005).17
17 Plutarch and St Francis of Assisi form two notable exceptions, as both advocated for the moral consideration of 
animals (Steiner, 2005).
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Finally, anthropocentrism may be rationalized through the simple maxim of “let’s solve
humanity’s problems first.” Through this perspective, it is suggested that given all of the problems
in the world, one can only concentrate one’s efforts in one area, and that area should be aimed at
helping humans first. It does not take much consideration to see that this maxim means animal
concerns may never be addressed, for when might we arrive at a world without any human
problems? This perspective also suggests that working on multiple problems in tandem is not
conceivable, which is incorrect—in fact, given the intersecting nature of many oppressions,
18working on some “animal problems” may work toward helping humans, as well.
These rationalizations outline some of the ways anthropocentrism may be justified or 
protected from critical consideration. In the end, the anthropocentric perspective is just that— a 
perspective—and humans may defend it any way they choose: perhaps on account of the benefits it 
brings them, or perhaps because it is a hegemonic worldview that they either have not thought to 
consider or do not care to challenge, or both.
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss some of anthropocentrism’s meanings, 
manifestations, and rationalizations, and to unpack the concept and consider some components 
that comprise it. Throughout this chapter I hope to have identified that anthropocentrism is a 
common, although perhaps not closely examined bias in western culture, and that it is one that 
bears consequences for animals and humans alike. It is also a perspective that humans may defend 
vigorously, although the reasoning behind their defenses may not be especially compelling. I 
believe this consideration of anthropocentrism leads to further questions about the elements of 
power embedded in this mindset and how they are enacted in human-animal relations; to delve 
deeper into these questions I turn next to some bodies of theory that provide further insight.
18
For example, Ascione (1993) identifies linkages between childhood cruelty toward animals and later violence 
toward humans, suggesting intersecting oppressions between humans and animals, and humans and other humans.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Anthropocentrism Through Three Lenses
In this chapter I review ideas from three bodies of theory—animal liberation/animal rights 
theory, ecofeminism, and poststructuralism—and consider some insights each lens has to offer in 
relation to anthropocentrism. I chose to review these three lenses because each provides, in my 
opinion, interesting means of thinking about anthropocentrism, as well as interesting insights into 
human-animal relationships and the power dynamics within them. I find these lenses generative 
and compelling, although I recognize they are by no means the only lenses through which 
anthropocentrism could be considered.19
There are some key points of overlap among the three positions. One is that each considers 
how power functions to create uneven categories or identities, such as oppressor and oppressed, 
subject and object, and master discourses and subjugated knowledges. These categories are then 
applied directly to humans and animals (in the case of animal liberation/animal rights theory and 
some ecofeminist perspectives), or can be applied indirectly to them (in the case of 
poststructuralist theory), and in doing so can contribute to an understanding of anthropocentrism. 
A second point of overlap is that each lens is, in its own way, critical of the anthropocentric status 
quo, seeing it as unethical (animal liberation/animal rights), bound with gender oppression 
(ecofeminism), or on shaky ground to begin with (poststructuralism). Finally, the three lenses 
connect in that each articulates some form of alternative to anthropocentrism, or response to it.
There are also notable differences among the three positions. In particular, each has its own 
distinct subject matter, and of the three only animal liberation/animal rights theory considers 
animals consistently and foundationally. Some ecofeminist writings consider animals directly, but
Other possible lenses include deep ecology, religious writings, postmodern theory, and various types of 
anti-oppression theory, to name a few examples.
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more commonly the categories of nature, ecology, or environmentalism are taken as central and 
animals are subsumed within them. Finally, within poststructuralist theory animals are far from 
being the main subject matter; however, some poststructuralist ideas can be applied to animals and 
to human-animal relations in general. The lenses therefore differ considerably in their engagement 
with the concept of anthropocentrism, and they also differ in the “worldview” each proposes. I 
consider each lens in turn.
Animal Liberation/Animal Rights
Popularized by Singer (1975) and Regan (1983) respectively, animal liberation and animal 
rights theory challenge anthropocentrism by advocating that humans should extend moral 
consideration to animals. Both theories outline philosophical arguments to make the case that 
animals are deserving of moral attention, but the criteria backing each argument differs (hence the 
two titles, animal liberation and animal rights).20 The theories are therefore different, but their 
prescribed outcomes are similar, as I discuss below.
Singer: Expanding the moral community.
In his groundbreaking book Animal Liberation (1975), Singer argues that membership in 
the moral community, currently restricted to humans, should expand to include animals on the 
grounds of their sentience. His argument is positioned within a utilitarian framework, one 
concerned with producing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Singer’s philosophy is 
that utilitarian theory’s current restriction to humans, and our ability to experience pleasure and 
pain, is blatantly speciesist: if  animals also experience pleasure and pain, then their interests must
20
Both positions differ from animal welfare, which is concerned with “ensuring that animals are treated humanely, or 
as humanely as possible given whatever humans have decided... to do with them ... The animal welfare world does not 
challenge the established social order ... except to urge that whatever is done to [animals] be done as kindly as 
possible” (Montgomery, 2000, p. 3).
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be taken into consideration, as well. If not, the theory is incoherent.
Singer draws on the words of utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, who said about animals: “The 
question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they sufferl” (Bentham, 1789, 
Chapter 17, section 1). Animals can and do suffer, Singer argues, and we can be fairly confident of 
this because of their behavioural and physiological responses to pain-inducing stimuli, the 
similarities between their nervous systems and our own, and animals’ presumed evolutionary 
adaptation to be sensitive to pain. This evidence qualifies animals as sentient,21 Singer proposes, 
and as sentient beings they deserve a place in the moral community where “the interests o f every 
being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like 
interests of any other being” (1975, p. 5). In other words, every sentient beings’ interests should 
count, whether human or animal; everyone’s satisfaction and pain matters and should be taken into 
consideration. Singer notes that just as the moral community has expanded in the past to include 
previously excluded humans (e.g., women and slaves), it should now expand to include animals.
Including animals in the moral community would lead to a revisioning of human-animal 
relations. Singer suggests that to this end, we should enact a calculation of harms and goods, or a 
weighing of interests that takes into consideration the interests of both humans and animals. All 
practices in which humans use animals should be re-examined and, in many cases, stopped: Singer 
argues that we should not eat meat because it causes suffering and is a luxury rather than a 
necessity, we should not wear furs or leather for the same reasons, and we should not conduct 
experiments on animals unless, generally speaking, we would be prepared to conduct the same 
research on humans. His argument for animal liberation is therefore one of moral extensionism, in 
which he argues that the moral community should expand to include animals and, in doing so, 
liberate them from human usage.
Conversely, the lack of such evidence in plants, fungi, microorganisms, and mollusks disqualifies them from 
Singer’s scheme of sentience.
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Regan: Equal consideration for “subjects-of-a-life. ”
Regan’s ideology, expressed most comprehensively in his book The Case fo r  Animal 
Rights (1983), is grounded in natural rights theory. Regan’s theory is that animals should not be 
used for human ends because they are, in his words, “subjects-of-a-life” (1983, p. 243). All 
subjects-of-a-life have an experiential welfare, which Regan explains as meaning that “what 
happens to us—whether to our bodies, or our freedom, or our lives themselves—matters to us 
because it makes a difference to the quality and duration of our lives, as experienced by us, 
whether anyone else cares about this or not” (2004, p. 50). For Regan, any being (human or animal) 
who is a subject-of-a-life should be considered as having inherent value, and all beings with 
inherent value should be granted moral consideration.
Regan’s philosophy is a response to Kant’s idea that the inherent value of humans lies in 
their rationality and ability to make autonomous moral decisions, and that because of these 
characteristics humans are owed moral consideration as “ends” as opposed to “means to ends” 
(Kant, 1785/1996). Regan points out that Kant’s argument is flawed because not all people are 
rational or capable of making autonomous moral decisions: infants, children, and people with 
severe mental disabilities may be “irrational,” for example, yet they are still treated as “ends.” 
Regan proposes that instead of rationality and autonomy, being a subject-of-a-life should count as 
the criteria for possessing inherent value, and hence being granted moral consideration.
In Regan’s scheme, all beings who are subjects-of-a-life have the right to be treated with 
respect, and treated in a way that does not reduce them to the status of things. From this position 
the outcomes of his animal rights philosophy are categorical: “the total abolition of the use of 
animals in science, the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture, and the total elimination 
of commercial and sport hunting and trapping” (1986, p. 32). Regan argues it is wrong for humans 
to use animals for reasons other than their own survival (e.g., for information, career advancement, 
entertainment, culinary habit, convenience, or profit) because doing so constitutes treating them as 
things, and this is in conflict with animals having inherent value. Animal rights is not a matter of
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improving the conditions of animal treatment, he stresses, but one of stopping the perspective and 
usage of animals as resources altogether. As he puts it, the goal is not bigger cages, but empty 
cages.
Regan’s philosophy is more aligned with current expressions of the animal rights 
movement than is Singer’s utilitarian weighing of harms and benefits.22 Animal rights is often 
expressed as the philosophy that animals have claims on their lives and an interest in leading their 
own lives, and as such humans should not use them. Montgomery (2000) summarizes the position 
in saying that animals “are not here on sufferance or as raw materials until we need them for dinner 
or for an extra body organ or for a science experiment. They have rights, to use the language we are 
most familiar with, or perhaps inherent rights. Their value does not depend upon how useful they 
are to us” (p. 2). Similarly, the animal rights organization People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals summarizes their position as follows: “[Animals] are capable of suffering and have an 
interest in leading their own lives; therefore, they are not ours to use— for food, clothing, 
entertainment, experimentation, or any other reason” (2006, homepage).
Challenges to anthropocentrism.
The animal liberation and animal rights philosophies challenge anthropocentrism in 
various ways. Most obviously they do so through their arguments, which disrupt the idea that 
humans alone are worthy of moral consideration. The “humans at the centre” mentality is 
contested through the flaws Singer and Regan identify in traditional ethics philosophy, be it 
utilitarianism’s myopic focus on humans’ abilities to experience pleasure and pain, or the limits of 
natural rights theory’s focus on rationality and autonomy. Their arguments render philosophy’s 
privileging of humans illogical, and in doing so challenge the human-animal divide that
22
In spite of this, Singer is often erroneously labelled the “father of the animal rights movement” (a label contested by 
feminists who argue that women comprised the genesis of the movement, as I discuss in the “Ecofeminism” section of 
this chapter).
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characterizes anthropocentrism.
Both theories also challenge anthropocentrism on an “active” level as they make animals 
their central subject matter. By providing readers with detailed accounts of the conditions humans 
inflict upon animals (and animals’ responses to them), animals are continuously evoked in readers’ 
imaginations, which in itself disrupts anthropocentrism. Further, animals are evoked in deep ways 
as readers are called upon to consider that animals experience pain, stress, loneliness, despair, 
frustration, depression, and a host of other emotions which, in an anthropocentric vein, might be 
thought of as belonging only to humans.23 These detailed accounts make it difficult to cancel out 
consideration for animals, and as such they engage readers in a process of actively resisting 
anthropocentrism.
The philosophies also challenge anthropocentrism through any counter-anthropocentric 
outcomes of their arguments, i.e., any changes people make after considering the arguments. 
While it is not known to what extent the books influence action, Regan’s book is widely 
recognized as a foundational book in the movement and Singer’s Animal Liberation has been 
especially popular, having sold over 450,000 copies and been translated into 15 languages (Bailey, 
2000). With this popularity, it is hard to imagine that no readers have been influenced by their 
arguments.
Speaking for myself, I found Animal Liberation highly convincing that, on a massive scale, 
animals suffer at the hands of humans. Reading the book was, for me, a harrowing experience, 
despite the fact I was somewhat familiar with the information Singer outlined in it. About a year 
before reading the book I had started to gain awareness of the treatment of animals in the various 
industries that use them, and by the time I read the book I had stopped eating animal-derived foods 
(meat, milk, cheese, eggs) and had decided to stop purchasing products tested on animals or made 
of animal skins. This being the case, I didn’t need much “convincing” from Singer’s argument;
23
While Singer and Regan focus primarily on animals’ capacities for suffering, other authors have rounded out the 
discussion by researching animals’ capacities for pleasure (e.g., Balcombe, 2006).
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nonetheless I thought his book outlined a strong case that the harms animals endure in becoming 
“products” outweigh any pleasure I might derive from using them. Regan’s subject-of-a-life 
criteria also resonated with me, as it evoked, and continues to evoke in me, a position in which I 
consider other animals as beings, that is, as individuals with their own consciousness who care 
about what happens to them. These animals are, as Regan says, “subjects” in their own lives, and 
to me it seems vitally important to keep this in mind when contemplating an ethic toward them.
Animal liberation and animal rights 
theory also inform an entire movement that 
challenges anthropocentric thoughts and/or 
behaviours. This movement is expressed in 
multiple ways and through multiple spheres, 
including a performative or artistic sphere 
(e.g., via street theatre or protests - see 
Figures 16 and 17), a personal lifestyle sphere 
(e.g., via personal decisions to resist 
anthropocentrism), an educative sphere (to be 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), a legal sphere 
(e.g., by creating or challenging laws 
pertaining to animal (ab)use), an z'/legal 
sphere (e.g., via “live rescues” of animals 
from laboratories or fur farms), and any 
combination of these or any other spheres.
There are therefore many facets to the movement, each of which hold the potential to disrupt the 
status quo, and each which is at least in part informed by the philosophies of Singer and Regan. 
The animal rights movement and its history are further discussed by Francione (1996), 
Montgomery (2000), and Beers (2006).
Figure 16: Protest for laboratory animals. 
Source: Arkansas Indymedia, 2003.
Stirs*.
Figure 17: Protest against fur usage. 
Source: Houston Indymedia, 2003.
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Ecofeminism
Ecofeminism is a movement that combines theory and action to address intersecting 
environmental and feminism concerns. Gaard (1998) identifies five streams of thought and action 
that comprise the movement: peace and antinuclear activism, feminist spirituality, animal 
liberation, environmentalism, and antitoxics work. The movement is inherently plural with no 
singular perspective or theory or action guiding it. Some feminists (e.g., Mies & Shiva, 1993) see 
this diversity as keeping the movement vital.
Plumwood (1993) suggests ecofeminism may be feminism’s third wave, building on the 
waves that came before it—the first wave being the liberal feminism of the 19th century, and the 
second wave being the radical feminism of the 1960s/1970s. Both the first and second waves were 
concerned with expanding understandings of who “counts:” liberal feminists fought for women to 
be recognized and granted legal rights, while radical feminists turned a critical eye toward the 
feminist movement itself, criticizing it for addressing exclusively the concerns of white, 
middle-class women and pushing it to respond to the intersections between gender-based 
oppression and oppressions based on race, class, sexuality, and ability. Ecofeminists continue this 
push toward a more inclusive feminist agenda, this time bringing nature, environmentalism, and 
animals into the fold. I consider below some feminist contributions connected to what Gaard (1998) 
labelled the “animal liberation stream” of the ecofeminist movement.
Anthropocentrism or androcentrism?
Some feminists argue that the oppression of women and the oppression of animals are 
linked under the wider banner of patriarchy, and that as such anthropocentrism should be renamed 
androcentrism, meaning “man at the centre,” to reflect the idea that it is not only animals who are 
pushed outside the boundaries of moral consideration, but women along with them (Jones, 2004; 
Plumwood, 1997). Warren (1994) suggests this occurs as women and nature/animals are linked
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together and devalued in tandem: “[T]he exploitation of nature and animals is justified by 
feminizing them; the exploitation of women is justified by naturalizing them” (p. 37).
Jones (2004) identifies several linkages between the oppression of women and the 
oppression of animals, arguing that “speciesism and sexism are so closely related one might say 
they are the same thing under different guises” (p. 139). She cites as evidence that women and 
animals have historically both been seen as the property of males, that patriarchy and pastoralism 
appeared on the historical stage together, that both women and animals are seen as less rational and 
more constrained by their biology than men, and that both suffer by being reduced to their bodies 
or body parts. She also notes that tactics of objectification, ridicule, and control of reproduction are 
used to exploit both women and animals, and that there is also a form of “double oppression” 
combining sexism and speciesism that affects farmed animals, as the female animals endure a 
particularly heavy brunt of abuse.24
Adams (2004) sees women and farmed animals linked in a cycle of “objectification, 
fragmentation, and consumption” (p. 58)— women on a metaphorical/sexual level, and animals 
literally. She argues that both are objectified as “meat” (women as sexual objects; animals as 
actual meat); both are fragmented into body parts (parts of women’s bodies are deemed sexual and 
focused upon; animals’ bodies are literally fragmented); and both are then “consumed” by men. 
She labels this consumption (and indeed the entire cycle of objectification, fragmentation, and 
consumption) a masculine pursuit by suggesting that in relation to women, men are the primary 
consumers of pornography, and in relation to animals they are the primary eaters of meat.
As discussed in Chapter 2, anthropocentrism manifests itself in disparaging linguistic
24 For example, in modem “factory farms” female cows and pigs (sows) are kept in a near-constant cycle of 
impregnation throughout their lives; when their reproductivity wanes they are sent to slaughter (Robbins, 2001).
Men eat disproportionately more meat than women, Adams notes, and in historical periods when meat has been 
scarce (e.g., during wartime) it has been reserved for men, making it a “patriarchal text” (2004, p. 33). There are also 
connections between meat-eating and notions of masculinity, as it is considered “manly” to eat large portions of meat, 
and preparing meat for consumption (barbequing, “carving the roast”) is often considered a man’s job in western 
culture.
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metaphors as the names of animals are used to insult humans and the word “animal” functions as 
an insult itself. Many animal terms are applied to women, who may be described as “pets, cows, 
sows, foxes, chicks, serpents, bitches, beavers, old bats, old hens, mother hens, pussycats, cats, 
cheetahs, bird-brains, and hare-brains” (Warren, 1994, p. 37). These terms are insulting to women, 
and Dunayer (1995) suggests that by implication they are insulting to animals as well, as they 
merge them into a homogenous, derogatory category: all dogs, for example, become Ugly. On a 
linguistic level, then, women and animals are linked through language that may be simultaneously 
sexist and speciesist.
In addition to the imposed linkages between women and animals, women and nature are 
often coupled as well. Women are often constructed as closer to nature or more connected to it; as 
life-givers themselves they are sometimes considered more “in tune” with “mother earth” (Roach, 
2003). The “mother earth” moniker itself demonstrates how the linkage works both ways: while 
women are constructed as closer to nature, nature is constructed as feminine. Merchant (1980) and 
Roach (2003) discuss how this construction of nature as feminine has given rise to dichotomous 
“good mother/bad mother” conceptualizations of nature, which may be portrayed as a bounteous, 
kind, and life-giving woman or a threatening, wild, and uncontrollable one. Masculinist discourses 
run through both of these conceptualizations: for example, nature may be constructed as a damsel 
in distress who must be “protected” or “saved” from being “raped” (Kheel, 1995); conversely 
nature may be conceptualized as a wicked mother whom the “men of science” must conquer, 
master, and tame (Warren, 1994).
By linking women to nature, women are also linked to animals, since animals are 
associated with nature. While many of the linkages outlined above affect women metaphorically, 
women and animals are also linked in the realm of physical abuse, as both groups experience such 
abuse predominantly at the hands of men. Overwhelmingly it is men who batter, rape, and kill 
women, and overwhelmingly it is men who hunt, trap, and slaughter animals (Adams, 1995; Kheel, 
1995). For these reasons feminists in the animal defense movement suggest androcentrism, not
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anthropocentrism, is the problem affecting animals (see Figure 18). In the domestic sphere women 
and animals may also be linked in abuse: some men who batter women may abuse or kill a 
companion animal as a means of exerting control over the woman, and sometimes women will not 
leave an abusive situation if they cannot take the animal with them, for fear of what might happen 
to the animal if  they go (Ascione, Weber, & Wood, 1997).
By outlining some of 
the ways women and 
animals are linked together 
and disregarded, and by 
considering some of the 
insights a gendered 
analysis can reveal about 
violence toward women 
and violence toward 
animals, ecofeminism 
identifies a masculine 
power element in
anthropocentrism. If anthropocentrism is equal to “humans at the centre,” then ecofeminists 
suggest an even deeper centre exists which is comprised of men. The existence of this deeper 
centre demonstrates the need to consider anthropocentrism not only within a human-animal 
framework but a gendered framework, as well.
Criticisms o f animal liberation/animal rights theory.
An overarching feminist concern with animal liberation and animal rights theory is that the 
arguments they forward cannot provide an adequate response to anthropocentrism/androcentrism
It takes up to 40 dumb animals to rrate a fur coat.
But only or>e to  wear H
>4
Figure 18: Anthropocentrism or androcentrism? A feminist response to a 
Greenpeace billboard.
© Jill Posener, 2006.
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because they are constructed within, and rely upon, a worldview that is in itself flawed. 
Utilitarianism and rights theory, emerging from the 17th/18th century Age of Reason, begin with 
the depiction of society comprised of independent, autonomous agents who are, in a Hobbesian 
vein, competing with each other for scarce resources (Jaggar, 1983). Animal liberation and animal 
rights theory rely on this framework as they position animals as potentially competing “rights 
holders” within the moral community, whose interests or inherent value should be recognized by 
existing “rights holders” (i.e., humans). Feminists suggest this scheme is problematic for at least 
two reasons: (1) it ignores the reality that individuals are relational by nature and that during at 
least some stages of our lives (e.g., infancy and childhood) humans are deeply dependent on others 
(Jaggar, 1983; Zimmerman, 1995), and (2) it ignores the fact that most companion animals are 
deeply dependent on their human caretakers throughout their lives (Donovan & Adams, 1996). For 
these reasons, feminists suggest an ethic guiding human-animal relations must start with the 
acceptance that relationships are intrinsic to human identities, and intrinsic to at least some 
animals’ lives.
Feminists also find fault with animal liberation and animal rights theory’s attempt to negate 
emotion from the process of moral reasoning. Both philosophies exist within a rationalist 
framework where emotions are denied value or, at the very least, are subordinated to reason 
(Donovan, 1990). This is evident in Singer’s Animal Liberation as he states on the second page of 
his book that he is not especially “interested in” animals and does not “love” them; it is also 
evident in Regan’s The Case fo r  Animal Rights as he explains, also on the second page of his book, 
that he has made “a concerted effort not to indulge our emotions or parade our sentiments” as he 
presents his arguments (1983, p. xii).
Feminists argue that in trying to eliminate emotion, Singer’s and Regan’s rationalist 
positions shut down part of what it is to be human. Midgley (1978) suggests that trying to separate 
reason from emotion is ultimately counterproductive because the two are inherently connected to 
each other: thoughts are often powered by feelings, and feelings turn into thoughts. Kheel (1989)
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adds to this idea that emotions are inherent to the process of formulating an ethic, and in relation to 
animals “we cannot even begin to talk about the issue ... unless we admit that we care (or feel 
something)” (p. 259). From an ecofeminist perspective, then, an appropriate ethic should take into 
account emotion alongside reason.
Some suggest emotion may be the most natural place to begin contemplating an ethic 
toward animals, more so than engaging in a utilitarian calculation of harms and benefits or a 
reasoned deliberation of who qualifies as a subject-of-a-life. Donovan (1990) suggests that 
feelings, intuitions, sympathies, and the senses can provide us with the moral guidance we seek, 
and as such we do not need abstract philosophies to tell us “what we can already know with our 
own eyes and ears. Nonhuman animals are communicating... when they cry out, struggle to escape, 
or exhibit signs of stress or distress .... We should not exploit animals because they do not want to 
be so treated, and we know that. If we listen, we can hear them” (p. 375).
In addition to animal liberation and animal rights theory ignoring interdependence and 
emotions—characteristics that feminists note are often associated with women—they also ignore 
the contributions women have made, and continue to make, to the animal defense movement in 
general. While Singer and Regan are often credited for galvanizing the contemporary animal rights 
movement, there is a long history of women’s involvement in animal defense. Donovan (1990) 
states that 19th century feminists were concerned about vegetarianism and animal welfare issues; 
on a more contemporary note, Shapiro (1994) notes that women comprise the majority o f the 
current animal defense movement. Feminists suggest the gendered composition of the historical 
and contemporary movements should at least be recognized by Singer and Regan, and perhaps 
from this recognition a new or modified ethic might emerge.
Finally, the formal, universalizable rules that govern animal liberation and animal rights 
theory are subject to feminist criticism, as it is pointed out that such rules prevent decisions from 
being made in context. Warren (1994) suggests an appropriate ethic should allow for a 
particularized, situational response, one that can be made in the midst of a situation with attention
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to context, as opposed to being a formal code or rule-bound system that must be deontologically 
“obeyed.” She suggests ethics should emerge from a place: that is, one’s geographic location26 
should be reflected upon when considering what counts as appropriate human-animal relations, 
and situations should be addressed individually instead of having a universalizing rationalist 
philosophy applied at all times.
In light of the criticisms outlined above, a feminist ethic toward animals—one that begins 
from a position of acknowledging interdependence, honours insights borne of feelings as well as 
reasons, and is contextual rather than universal—might gamer more response among some people 
than the rigid philosophies of animal liberation and animal rights. As Donovan and Adams (1996) 
note, “some people, especially women—who compose the majority of the animal defense 
movement—might respond more to a discourse rooted in care theory than to one based on rights” 
(p. 11). Given Gilligan’s research contributions, as discussed below, this may well be true.
Revisioning human-animal ethics.
As outlined in the section above, there are flaws in traditional moral philosophy: it is rooted 
in a competitive worldview that precludes a relationship-based ontology, it exalts a masculinist 
perspective while ignoring the experiences of women, and it dismisses emotion in favour o f 
universal rules based on reason alone. These characteristics translate it into a moral philosophy 
that ignores “feminine” patterns of moral reasoning, according to Gilligan (1982), whose research 
countered Kohlberg’s (1975) previously published stages of moral development.
Gilligan’s research into male and female patterns of moral reasoning suggested that 
females tend to follow different patterns of moral decision-making than males: masculine 
conceptions of morality tend to be associated with fairness, rights, and rules, while feminine 
conceptions of it tend to be associated with care, responsibility, and relationships. From this
26 I think cultural and temporal location would also apply.
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Gilligan suggests females tend to prioritize different sets of values in the process of moral 
decision-making than do males (hence the title of her book, In a Different Voice), but this does not 
mean one set of values is superior to the other, only that they are different. Applying this idea to 
anthropocentrism or to the process of developing an ethic to guide human-animal relations, it may 
be argued that there is no singular ethic that constitutes the correct response to it; space should be 
made to accommodate differing patterns of moral reasoning as opposed to privileging the so-called 
“masculine” pattern alone.27
Proceeding from Gilligan’s understandings, Kheel (1989) suggests the first step toward a 
feminist orientation to nature, and to animals by extension, entails uniting our capacities for reason 
and emotion. She suggests that instead of imagining ourselves in a position of domination over 
nature we could imagine ourselves as being on a continuum with it; instead of considering all 
entities as competing rights holders we could operate from the perspective that we are all 
connected, we are all “one.” This perspective could contribute to dismantling the hierarchical 
mindset of humans over animals, as well as the echo of that mindset in philosophies which honour 
the mind at the expense of the heart. This ecofeminist perspective thus suggests that when it comes 
to responding to anthropocentrism we should start in a different place altogether: one not bound by 
abstract rules or rationalizations, but an engaged response incorporating reason and emotion in 
tandem.
To conclude this limited discussion of anthropocentrism through an eco feminist lens, 
eco feminism has contributed to an understanding of the concept in various ways: by providing a 
gendered critique of it, by identifying shortcomings associated with the dominant theory 
responding to it, and by envisioning an alternative ethic rooted in a relational ontology. These
27
The notion of “masculine” and “feminine” patterns, modes, or identities has been the subject of much feminist 
theorizing. The polarized positions in this theorizing are that of essentialism (or “difference feminism”), which 
proceeds from the belief that women possess a set of distinct characteristics based on their sex, and social 
constructionism, which suggests differences between the sexes are socially constructed, not biologically innate. 
Related to the feminist ethic of care, some see risks in celebrating an association between women and caring, such as 
MacGregor (2004) who argues that this linkage can impose limitations on women as political actors.
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contributions, I believe, provide a richer understanding of the concept and the responses available 
to it. To me, they speak to the need to consider power in a more nuanced context: not just as 
existing between humans and animals, but also between men and women and, more generally, 
between different groups of humans who enact power over each other. All oppressions may be 
emerging from the same source, and that source maybe the competitive, hierarchical mindset itself. 
As Lorde (1983) famously said, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”
(p. 94); in relation to anthropocentrism this suggests we may need to think in new ways if we want 
to realize alternatives to it.
Ecofeminism also speaks to me about the role emotional responses can play in determining 
one’s ethic toward animals. Forme, what counts as an appropriate ethic emerges, in part, from how 
I feel: when I look at a picture of a calf in a crate, for example, or when I think about the empty 
look of resignation I once saw on a caged monkey’s face at the Winnipeg zoo, I feel something; I 
feel an abuse of power is taking place. It hits me first at an emotional level, and I think that that 
emotion is a valid guide that can and should be used, alongside reason, in the formulation of an 
ethic. Can emotion and reason even be separated in the first place (Plumwood, 1997)? Both are 
human faculties, and as such I think that any ethic or philosophy will only be strengthened, and 
made more holistic, by employing the two together.
Poststructuralism
Poststructuralism emerged in France in the 1960s in response to structuralism, and is often 
associated with the writings of Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and Kristeva (Blackburn, 2005). As a 
body of theory it represented a rebellion against some of structuralism’s main tenets, such as the 
idea that there are underlying structures that can explain the human condition, that all texts have 
intrinsic meaning waiting to be uncovered, or that there are “ultimate answers” or meta-theories 
that can provide objective explanations of reality (Sim & Van Loon, 2004; Williams, 2005).
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Poststructuralists are often defined by their rejection of structuralist claims. They argue 
that what we know, or what we think we know as fact, is inherently unstable or slippery because 
our “knowledge” is produced in parcel with political and social contexts that shift over time. 
Through a poststructuralist lens there is no foundation of “truth” in the world, there are only 
understandings that are deeply and irrevocably influenced by context. Poststructuralists thus study 
both the “facts” and “truths” that comprise our knowledge, as well as the systems that work 
together to produce them. In this way, it can be understood as an inquiry into how knowledge itself 
is produced (Lye, 1997; Wikipedia, 2006b).
Poststructuralism draws attention to the relationship between knowledge and power. 
Power, as Foucault (1980) understood it, is relational, mobile, and mediated through social 
relations—meaning that it, alongside knowledge, can shift. Foucault argued that power is 
multi-faceted and exists on multiple levels: between individuals, between groups in society, and 
perhaps most prominently, between people and social institutions. One of the primary means by 
which power is mediated is through knowledge, and thus the study of knowledge, and the 
structures through which it emerges, offer possibilities for understanding anthropocentrism.
The discourse o f anthropocentrism.
According to Derrida (1974) language is always “mediated” through cultural texts,28 and 
as such it holds no fixed meanings. Derrida argues that texts have multiple meanings, that readers 
bring multiple interpretations to texts on account of their diverse identities, and that the time period 
in which a text is read influences its interpretation, and because of these factors it is impossible to 
arrive at a final, complete analysis of any text. All text is ambiguous, according to Derrida, and 
correspondingly language itself is ambiguous, displaying the property of differance—Derrida’s 
word to evoke the meanings of “difference” and “deferring” simultaneously. There is “difference”
28
A text can be taken to mean a written or spoken text, or more generally any sort of “communicative event,” such as 
a traffic sign (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000).
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inherent in language, according to Derrida; specifically, there are differences whereby words are 
understood in the context of their opposite or “different” meanings, further, since meaning is never 
solid or complete, it is constantly being put off or “deferred.” Derrida’s own writing reflects the 
idea of differance as it is characterized by multiple meanings, interpretations, and wordplays; 
Collins and Mayblin (2005) describe it as a matrix of intentional “derailed communication” and 
“undecidability” (p. 16).
Language has a particularly strong focus within poststructuralist theory as it is understood 
as not only mediating reality, but in fact creating it. Davies (2000) notes that “within 
poststructuralist theory, language is the most powerful constitutive force shaping what we 
understand as possible and what we desire within those possibilities” (p. 181, emphases mine). 
Language is a discourse, one of the “power discourses” or “master discourses” Foucault (1980) 
identified. Scott (1988) defines discourse as a “historically, socially, and institutionally specific 
structure of statements, truths, categories, and beliefs” (p. 415), which work together to constitute 
the “truth” as it is currently understood. Discourse permeates social institutions, as Foucault 
studied in detail,29 and these institutions are bound with a power that creates an illusion of truth 
while simultaneously subjugating other, competing knowledges.
Considering from a poststructuralist perspective the workings of language and the power 
discourses surrounding humans and animals suggests that anthropocentrism may be, above all, a 
construct rather than a “natural fact.” As previously discussed, dominant understandings of 
“human” and “animal” function to elevate humanity from animals, and disparaging animal 
metaphors further support this divide. These are two ways anthropocentrism is upheld 
linguistically; an “archeology,” to borrow Foucault’s (1969) use of the term,30 of the discourse of 
anthropocentrism could generate a multitude of words, meanings, and beliefs working in concert 
to support the mindset. Some possibilities are outlined in Figure 19.
29
He studied, for example, the discourses permeating hospitals, prisons, schools, and the institution of sexuality.
30 Foucault labelled his early research style as an “archaeology” of historical information relating to the institutions he 
studied.
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Discursive Phrase Function in Relation to Anthropocentrism
that/it (as animal pronouns) constructs animals as objects, not beings
describing animals by human-imposed 
function: dairy cow, game animals, 
furbearer, specimen, standardized 
production unit
makes animals’ usage by humans seem inevitable
meat constructs animals as food; erases animals’ identities and 
individualities; suggests animals exist inherently to be eaten
game turns (the killing of) animals into sport or recreation
euphemisms related to killing animals: 
cull, manage, thin the herd, harvest, 
sacrifice, destroy, put down
rationalizes and creates emotional distance from the act of killing
Figure 19: Examples of the anthropocentric power discourse.
According to Foucault (1980), humans’ experiences are deeply shaped by the discourses 
that purport to explain them. In very direct ways the same could be said about animals’ 
experiences, except in the case of animals they are constrained by human discourses and not their 
own. “The way we speak about other animals is inseparable from the way we treat them,” Dunayer 
says (2004, p. xiii); as some of the examples in Figure 19 illustrate, our discourse surrounding 
animals both constructs and constrains the ways we think about, and consequently treat them.
There are, however, multiple discourses, some of which are competing with the 
anthropocentric one. The equation of animals with their usefulness to humans, or their portrayal as 
“means to ends” as opposed to “ends” in themselves, is challenged by other “statements, truths, 
categories, and beliefs” (Scott, 1998, p. 415) about animals. There are multiple narratives that 
operate in tandem; for example, we might say there is an agricultural discourse, a biomedical 
discourse, an economic discourse, a religious discourse, an animal rights discourse, an animal 
welfare discourse, a “Walt Disney” discourse, and so on. According to Foucault (1980) discourses 
emerge and disappear through chance, and as such, from this poststructuralist perspective, 
anthropocentrism should not be considered a stable “truth.” I think it must also be recognized, 
however, that various forces give anthropocentrism a stronghold in western culture, such as 
economics and habit or tradition, and so while it may not be seen as a stable truth, it is 
unquestionably a strong one.
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Identities in flux: Deconstructing the human-animal binary.
Poststructuralism unsettles the security and centrality of the complacent human subject, 
and this opens the gates to more productive, malleable understandings of animals, which 
no longer need to be locked into the rhetorical role as humanity’s negative “other.” (Baker,
2001, 194)
Scott (1988) notes that the current patriarchal order is characterized by dichotomous 
thinking which results in a world divided into “opposites”: mind vs. matter, man vs. woman, 
nature vs. culture, universality vs. specificity, human vs. animal, and so on. These opposites are 
then arranged hierarchically, with one accorded primacy and associated with masculinity and the 
other associated with femininity and positioned as a corruption of the first. The second becomes, in 
de Beauvoir’s (1949) words, the “other,” but can animals be humanity’s “other” if  the identity of 
“human” is itself in flux?
Poststructuralism contests the idea of humanity as developed by Enlightenment thought 
and philosophy. It argues against the idea that humanity is universal or unchangeable in its essence, 
suggesting that humans are instead structured through culture and discourses (Scott, 1988). As 
Baker says in the quote above, through a poststructuralist perspective there is nothing 
“complacent” about the human subject, and so by extension there is nothing stable about the 
human/animal binary, either.
The notion of the human identity in flux, shifting with social, political, and cultural 
contexts, becomes evident upon considering the multiple identities humans assume toward 
animals. Individually, culturally, and cross-culturally, humans assume multiple, and often 
contradictory identities toward them: for example, according to the anthropocentric discourse in 
western culture there are some animals we are to love (e.g., dogs, cats), some we are to admire (e.g., 
eagles, lions) some we are to disparage (e.g., skunks, rats), some we are to eat (e.g., pigs, chickens), 
some we are to use as decoration (e.g., tropical fish), some we are to experiment on (e.g., mice,
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frogs), some we are to associate with superstition (e.g., black cats) and so on; this demonstrates the 
discursive push to assume multiple identities at once. These identities are largely culturally 
constructed, and as Figures 20 and 21 show they may shift cross-culturally.
Figure 20: Cow in India, roaming free. Figure 21: Cow in America, raised for veal production.
© Zoe Malinova, 2006. Source: The Farm Sanctuary, 2006.
Can we deconstruct ourselves, or the dominant narratives that constitute us? I think that to 
some extent we can, based on my own experiences of revisioning human-animal relations. 
Through exposure to what might be termed “competing discourses” to anthropocentrism, my 
“identities,” or my thoughts and actions in relation to animals shifted; I became someone different, 
my “truths” changed along with my “knowledge.” Shifts such as these can happen when we pay 
attention to marginalized voices or textual silences, one of many paths Derrida (1974) employed as 
a means of deconstruction. When we pay attention to what is not being said, when we follow the 
silences, we can locate subjugated knowledges. Anthropocentrism relies on silence: by focusing 
on humans or making them the exclusive centre of attention, animals become negated from 
consideration and are made almost unthinkable.
Davies (2000) discusses two responses to poststructuralist theory: one where the power of 
discourses is seen as so strong that it rules out the possibility for human agency, and one where the 
inherent instability of knowledge is seen as an optimistic “opening up of possibilities for 
undermining the inevitability of particular oppressive forms of subjection” (p. 180). In relation to
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anthropocentrism, poststructuralism seems, to me, to illuminate a bit of both: the deep shapings of 
the anthropocentric discourse on humans’ thoughts and behaviours, and the inherent uncertainty of 
anthropocentrism itself.
Yet, that uncertainty needs to be interrogated if it is to be disrupted, and in various ways 
language constrains that interrogation in the first place. It becomes a circular process: how do we 
represent animals in our discourse, and to what extent do those representations dictate their/our 
reality? More to the point, can we think ourselves into a new reality, if our reality is dictated by our 
thoughts? Perhaps here we hit some form of a limitation—although this is far from a matter of 
defeat. To quote Fudge (2002), maybe what needs to be done is to “acknowledge the limitations of 
our own perspective, but simultaneously accept that what we can achieve within those limitations 
is important and worthwhile, even if it is only the best that we can do” (p. 159).
The purpose of this chapter has been to consider anthropocentrism through three lenses, to 
explore the insights three differing perspectives can generate in regard to the concept. Each lens 
makes a contribution to understanding human-animal relations and how power is exercised within 
them: animal liberation and animal rights theory demonstrates the human-centrism of moral 
philosophy, ecofeminism outlines the connections between animal oppression and other forms of 
oppression (particularly sex- and gender-based oppression), and poststructuralism identifies some 
of the structural ways power is dispersed. This chapter, and the previous one, comprise my 
analysis of the concept as it relates to my overarching argument: that anthropocentrism should be 
considered, and challenged, in the context of education. I turn attention to education next.




In this chapter I consider the relationship between anthropocentrism and the educational 
system. As discussed in the previous two chapters, anthropocentrism is a wide-reaching 
perspective that is rooted in various social institutions and discourses; education is no exception. In 
the first part of this chapter I outline some indicators of an anthropocentric bias in the western 
educational system, specifically in primary and secondary schools,31 as well as some of the ways 
this mindset is produced and reproduced in those schools-—most notably, through silence and a 
lack of its consideration.
Is the production/reproduction of anthropocentrism congruent with education and its 
conceptual aims? Are schools places where the human-animal divide should be addressed, or 
should any attention be paid to it at all? I consider these questions in the second section of this
32chapter, while forwarding my argument that anthropocentrism should be addressed in education 
because (a) it is a biased way of seeing the world that has significant effects on humans and 
animals, even if it is being produced unconsciously and (b) the lack of its consideration is at odds 
with what I see as some fundamental tenets of education: namely, critical thinking, caring, and 
coming to a critical consciousness. In my opinion students deserve an opportunity to critically 
consider anthropocentrism in education so that they are aware of it and can decide for themselves 
whether they find it a tenable worldview. Further, I think the educational system is as an ideal 
place for this to happen because it is an institution that is concerned with (or should be concerned 
with) developing students’ abilities to understand themselves and the world around them, and such 
abilities could only be augmented through an awareness of anthropocentrism.
31 A broader scope might also take into account higher education institutions, as well as informal educative settings
such as museums or parks.
32 In the next chapter, I discuss how it might be addressed.
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In the final section of this chapter I consider where anthropocentrism fits within a critical 
pedagogy approach to education. While the field of critical pedagogy focuses predominantly on 
human concerns alone (Bell & Russell, 2000), I find that this humanist framework is in conflict 
with some of the dominant ideas that guide critical pedagogy praxis. I conclude this chapter by 
exploring some of the (dis)connections between critical pedagogy and the study of 
anthropocentrism, explaining why I believe an inclusive critical pedagogy should recognize and 
challenge the human-animal divide.
A (Hidden) Curriculum o f Anthropocentrism?
The term “hidden curriculum” was reportedly coined in 1968 by Jackson, a sociologist 
who argued in his book Life in Classrooms that education is a socializing process through which 
social norms and values are transmitted (Jackson, 1968; Wikipedia, 2007a). The hidden 
curriculum is said to refer to all of the outside-the-curriculum knowledge that is passed on through 
schools and that students pick up without being explicitly taught—through the hidden curriculum 
students learn what counts as socially approved knowledge, and what attitudes, perspectives, and 
beliefs are considered appropriate to hold (Kincheloe, 2005).
Students thus learn through both the hidden curriculum and the explicit curriculum33 alike. 
Together, these two forms of curricula wield a great deal of power over students, as they 
communicate to them what counts as legitimate or appropriate knowledge and, conversely, what is 
considered inappropriate or unworthy of study. Since choices are made as to what to include and 
what to omit in curricula, education can be seen as a deeply political institution. As Kincheloe 
(2005) writes, “Any time teachers develop a pedagogy, they are concurrently constructing a 
political vision” (p. 9), and this speaks to the nature of education as intimately bound with politics 
and power.
33 Meaning, the documents that outline the curriculum and what students are to learn.
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Foucault (1977) argued that power is exercised not only through the overt controls it 
maintains over people, but also by what it prevents or makes unthinkable: what barriers it places 
on the mind. This applies to education, the explicit curriculum, and the hidden curriculum as it 
could be argued that students are overtly controlled by what they are taught, how they are 
organized, and what they must do to advance through the system, and they are covertly controlled 
through the hidden curriculum and what it silences or renders unthinkable.34 Together, these overt 
and covert controls create a political climate in education by formulating the boundaries o f what is 
deemed legitimate thought.
Orr (1992) speaks of “omissions and commissions” in curricula: omissions of perspectives 
or information resulting from choices of what (not) to make part of the official curriculum, which 
often constitute commissions to the dominant discourse or social order. While Orr evokes this 
discussion in relation to ecological literacy (and is not taking a Foucauldian perspective, per se), I 
see it as applying equally to anthropocentrism and education, where the omission of 
anthropocentrism’s consideration in education also comprises a commission to the anthropocentric 
status quo. Together, these omissions and commissions construct a (hidden) curriculum of 
anthropocentrism, as well as an educational system that both produces and reproduces the 
anthropocentric status quo in western culture. I explore some forms of this 
production/reproduction next.
Anthropocentric silences.
Silence can, ironically, say a lot. It can suggest a person has nothing to say, or that he or she 
has something to say but doesn’t have the language or the discursive tools with which to say it. It 
can communicate the message that a subject is so trivial it is literally not worth talking about, or it 
can suggest complicity in the absence of dissent. It can also suggest a subject matter is taboo or
34 This connects to the poststructuralist focus on discourse and power, as discussed in the previous chapter.
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unmentionable, or, as previously discussed, literally unthinkable. In relation to anthropocentric 
silences in education I think all of these explanations may apply, and together they can make the 
human-centred bias, as well as any of its competing discourses, almost unspeakable.
I see silence as the main way anthropocentrism is perpetuated in education. Thinking 
through the standard subject areas of the educational system—e.g., math, science, social studies, 
English, physical education, health, history, geography, drama, art, music—it seems to me that 
these subjects are primarily and overwhelmingly about humans and the human world. There are, of 
course, some entry points within them for discussion about animals or consideration of 
human-animal relations, but a critical consideration of such topics is not a central part o f these 
subjects. Further, anthropocentrism does not appear to be a highly valued topic in the educational 
system in general, as subjects in which its consideration might take place (e.g., environmental 
education or humane education, to be discussed further in Chapter 5) remain marginalized in the 
system, if they are represented at all (Orr, 1992; Selby, 2000). This being the case, students might 
easily go through a school day or several days without ever contemplating the relationships they 
hold with animals, despite the fact that our lives are in many ways enmeshed with animals’ 
lives.
I should step back for a moment here to stress that I can in no way make sweeping 
generalizations about what “education,” a complicated and multi-faceted category, is singularly 
achieving. There are so many factors that influence a person’s educational experience, including 
his or her teachers, peers, the general school environment, the curricula, the resources, the school’s 
guiding principles and framework, and so on—not to mention a person’s background, experiences, 
cultural location, socio-economic status, worldview, and identity. All of these factors, and likely 
many more, coalesce to comprise a person’s “educational experience,” and because of this no 
simple statements can be made as to what we “learn” or “teach” in education. As it likely goes 
without saying, we all come from different places and experience the world in our own ways; we 
are all unique. It is not my intention to gloss over difference in this chapter, but only to discuss
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some anthropocentric trends I see in the system as a whole.
One of those trends, then, is in the curricula, where the subjects of animals and 
human-animal relations tend to be marginalized. This is a trend that rings true to my own 
educational experience; thinking back to my first 12 years of education it is surprising to me how 
little time I spent contemplating animals, learning to appreciate them or their needs, or coming to 
understand the larger industries that rely on them to remain profitable. I can, in fact, count on one 
hand the times I can recall an educational experience that focused explicitly on animals: there was 
a report I wrote about dogs in Grade 4, the dissection of a worm in Grade 7, the dissection of a frog 
in Grade 10, and a brief debate in a Grade 12 elective philosophy course about the intelligence of 
dolphins (if they could talk, would they be as smart as humans?). These are, as far as I can 
remember, the times in which I expressly considered animals in education.
Of course there may be much I am forgetting, particularly from my younger years, because 
as a young person my world was, like that of most young people in western society, filled with 
representations o f animals. In recent years I have come to notice how animals appear almost 
ubiquitously in children’s worlds: they are represented in stories, fairy tales, nursery rhymes, 
songs, cartoons, television shows, movies, stuffed animals, toys, clothing, wallpaper, bed sheets, 
and so on; they are a recurring motif in children’s worlds to say the least! Although these 
representations are often highly distorted and anthropomorphic, the point remains that children’s 
worlds are (figuratively) inhabited by animals, and correspondingly children’s imaginations seem 
to be inhabited by them, too.35
Our consideration of animals seems to wane as we grow older. The representations of 
animals in our worlds diminish; our worlds, in general, become much more anthropocentric. 
Fawcett (2006) suggests that as we grow older animals become cultured out of us and
For example, a dream database of over 16,000 dreams maintained at the University of California demonstrates that 
animals comprise up to 50 percent of all characters in children’s dreams, compared to only 5 percent in adults’ dreams 
(Schneider & Domhoff, 2007).
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consequently lost to our “ethical imaginations”; this is in part fostered by the educational system as 
students learn to stop thinking about animals. This connects to both the explicit curriculum, where 
content and resources pertaining to animals diminish, and the hidden curriculum, as students learn 
that animals and the ethics surrounding human-animal relations do not count as “official” subject 
matter and hence, legitimate knowledge.
My perception that animal representations in curricula diminish as students advance in the 
system is also based on my six years’ experience editing provincial curricula for the Manitoba 
department of education. From 1999-2005 I edited Kindergarten-Senior 4 (Grade 12) curricula and 
related educational materials, and I noticed that while animal representations were somewhat 
common in curricular materials for younger students (especially in children’s books and videos), 
they dropped off rather quickly in the materials for older students, to the point that in the senior 
years’ materials it was unusual to find any animal representations at all. I also noticed that 
representations of animals in the materials for older students were clustered in English Language 
Arts curricula, where one might find, for example, a poem, picture, or short story featuring an 
animal. Finally, I noticed a shift in terms of how the animals were portrayed or represented in 
curricula: for younger students there was often an educational component of learning about an 
animal, or perhaps learning about the similarities between humans and animals, whereas for older 
students animal representations, especially those outside of English Language Arts curricula, had 
largely taken on an anthropocentric bent.36
There are two points I am making here: the first is that representations of animals seem to 
diminish in education as students advance through the western educational system, and the second 
is that the ways in which students are encouraged to consider animals changes as well. This second 
point is deeply connected to the idea that anthropocentrism is promoted through the hidden 
curriculum, because it is not just a matter of how much animals are considered in education, but
36 For example, animals were discussed in terms of dissection (science curricula), animal agriculture (an elective 
agriculture course), and food (health/physical education curricula).
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how they are considered there, as well. This opens up another point of inquiry concerning what 
discourses are forwarded about animals in the educational system, or what possibilities 
surrounding human-animal relations are cultivated in education or conversely, closed off.
Bell and Russell (2000) note that when animals are discussed in education, the discussions 
tend to occur outside of a context of ethics. This holds true to my experiences as both a student and 
an editor of curricula, where discussions of ethics were notably absent. These absences, as 
previously discussed, are not neutral; they send a message through their silence that the subjects 
are not worth discussing. In this case they also contribute to the perpetuation of human-centrism, 
as they make education an institution that allows to pass a general ignorance or lack of 
consideration about anthropocentrism, animals, and the ethics of human-animal relations. This 
seems especially true in regard to the “hot button” issues surrounding animals that are often the 
focus in animal rights communities, such as the usage of animals for food, research, clothing, and 
entertainment.
The fact that there is a general ignorance about the details of animals’ usage by humans has 
been noted by at least two university professors who teach animal studies courses, Andrzej ewski 
(2003) and Bryant (2005). Andrzejewski, who teaches at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota 
and began incorporating animal rights content into her courses in 1990, says it is a rare student who 
is well-informed about the human uses of animals or has considered the issues from an ethical 
perspective, but conversely all students already know the “other side”: “They have already been 
taught to believe that humans are superior to all other species, most specifically non-human 
animals. They have been taught to believe they must eat meat to be healthy, that animal testing is 
beneficial, and so on” (p. 2). Similarly Bryant, who has taught animal law courses at UCLA since 
1995, says she finds at the beginning of the semester that students are “not fully aware of what 
happens to animals in our society... students expect, and I think the broader society expects, that 
the anti-cruelty statutes... will be sufficient to protect animals from the types of harms that they see 
and read about in my class .... There is this disjuncture ... [students are unaware that] there are all
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kinds o f reasons why it is legally okay to exploit and harm animals” (Bryant, 2005, podcast). This 
disjuncture is largely manifested and maintained through silence, while what Andrzejewski refers 
to as the “other side” is the hegemonic status quo.
The experiences of these two professors, as well as my own experiences and observations, 
suggest there is a general ignorance about anthropocentrism and the ethics surrounding 
human-animal relations, and education seems to be complicit in this ignorance as it does not 
consistently or foundationally address the issues or raise critical awareness of them. While there is 
always the possibility that a particular teacher or a particular assignment will prompt student 
engagement with these issues, it seems safe to conclude that on the whole, students are subjected 
much more to the “other side,” that is, the anthropocentric view, than they are exposed to any of its 
competing discourses.
Humans-only spaces.
A second trend in education that may contribute to the promotion of anthropocentrism is 
the nature of educational spaces as predominantly humans-only spaces. Spaces can be considered 
part of the hidden curriculum as the physical layout of the school and the manner in which students 
are organized within it communicate messages regarding norms and values (Sociology Central, 
n.d.)— for example, the traditional classroom set-up with the teacher at the front of the classroom 
reinforces a structure whereby the teacher is perceived to have knowledge and authority over the 
students. I think that the organization of schools, as overwhelmingly human environments that are 
often cut off from “nature,” contribute to an anthropocentric mindset in education by keeping 
animals outside of the context of education, literally and figuratively.
In discussing schools as environments at odds with nature, Weston (1991) forwards that 
“human thought must be understood as ... profoundly constituted by its ‘environments’” and that 
“exclusively human environments may underwrite and inscribe anthropocentrism” 2-3). I agree
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with his assertion that our environments help to shape us, and I think that the manner in which 
animals are kept out of all “civilized” spaces (for of course this trend is not exclusive to schools37) 
contribute to an “out of sight, out of mind” reality that once again sends a message that humans are 
the ones who count. Weston (1991) suggests the anthropocentrized world closes out possibilities 
to transcend it, and if this is the case then the nature of schools as human-only environments is an 
important point to ponder.
It is also a tricky one, though, as there are obviously some good, practical reasons why 
humans need to uphold, at least to some extent, a physical divide between themselves and animals 
(e.g., some people have allergies, “wild” animals can be dangerous to humans). It would probably 
not do as a response to simply make schooling an outdoor activity, for example,38 but perhaps 
there are ways to work toward transcending the anthropocentric trend in education through 
different school designs or increased outdoor activities (I address the idea of spending time 
outdoors in Chapter 5). Such possibilities might contribute to a challenging of anthropocentrism 
by increasing students’ opportunities to have encounters with the world beyond the human.
I am not suggesting here that having contact with animals necessarily leads to a 
transcendence of human-centrism. As I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, anthropocentrism is a 
complex and multi-faceted perspective that is supported and inscribed in various ways, including 
through our language, belief systems, “truths,” and so on. As such, there is no simple “fix” to it. 
What I am trying to suggest instead is that one of the ways anthropocentrism is produced and 
reproduced in education is through the physical environment, which is predominantly reserved for 
humans, and that this contributes to a “forgetting” about animals and hence a reinforcement o f 
human-centrism.
Far from it; schools are just one example of anthropocentrized spaces. Most buildings are human-dominated spaces, 
which limit people’s contact with animals. This represents another form of anthropocentrism—one concerning land 
usage and ownership of space—in which animals’ needs are disregarded in favour of human interests.
Or might it? I am not sure, but such a change would certainly require a massive overhaul of the system!
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Dissection.
A third way anthropocentrism may be promoted in education is through animal dissections. 
Animaleam (2005) estimates that approximately 75-80% of students will dissect at least one 
animal during their schooling experience, although the vast majority of those students will never 
enter a career where the dissection experience is even remotely related to their work.
It is not known how many animals are dissected each year in Canada, as the Canadian 
Council on Animal Care does not require schools or universities to maintain records on dissection 
activities. In America, however, Balcombe (quoted in Rosenberger, 1998) suggests that between 
10-12 million animals are killed for dissection each year; of these he estimates the vast majority 
are wild caught animals such as frogs, turtles, grasshoppers, crayfish, starfish, and earthworms. 
Other commonly dissected animals include fetal pigs (procured from slaughterhouses), and rats, 
mice, dogs, and cats, which may come from dealers, shelters, pounds, and biological supply 
companies (Animal Alliance, n.d.) (see Figure 22). Perusing the website of WARD’S, one of 
Ontario’s largest biological supply companies, shows 
that schools can purchase animals online and in bulk, 
dead or alive—for example, three live crayfish cost 
$8.99, a pail of 10 dead mice cost $19.95, a pack of 10 
dead frogs, $89.00 (WARD’S Natural Sciences, 2007).
It is clear that this industry, which relies on the traffic 
in animals, is anthropocentric, making schools that 
purchase from it supporters of anthropocentric 
practices.
Figure 22: Frogs in a biological supply 
company, awaiting shipment.
Source: Animal Alliance.
Beyond the procurement of animals for dissection, dissection is in itself an anthropocentric 
activity, as it positions animals as “resources for our disposal, not living organisms who 
experience pain and suffering, and desire only to lead their lives” (Animal Alliance, n.d., 3), and 
reduces them to “mere commodities, disposable resources for our curiosity and convenience,
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possessing no value in their own right” (Selby, 1995, p. 255). It likely goes without saying that 
animals in no way benefit from the dissection process, which makes it an entirely human-centric 
activity that promotes, in an educational context, an anthropocentric view of animals.
While proponents of dissection point to the human medical gains that have resulted from 
dissection (which is anthropocentric reasoning in itself), these same ends can now be achieved 
through alternatives such as computer simulations, CD-ROMS, plastic models of animals, and 
books and diagrams (Jukes & Chiuia, 2003). Such alternatives are used and respected by numerous 
medical schools, many of which choose them over animal dissections.39 The alternatives are also 
more economical than animal dissections, as the materials can be used over and over and shared 
among classes, and they present a viable alternative for students who object to animal dissection 
on personal, ethical, or religious grounds.
The choice to include dissection in the curriculum or to employ alternatives to it is one that 
each school makes. Dissection is a practice that is inherently, and at all of its stages, in the interests 
of humans alone, and so schools that offer it and students who pursue it engage with the 
anthropocentric viewpoint of animals as commodities for human purposes.
Classroom pets.
A final topic I wish to consider in this section is the practice of keeping classroom pets and 
its connections to anthropocentrism. This is a less straightforward topic than that of silence, space, 
and dissection, for in some ways having contact with animals can challenge anthropocentrism, but 
at the same time the reasoning for keeping classroom pets is often anthropocentric.
39
The Vancouver Humane Society reports that the top 10 medical colleges in the United States (including Stanford, 
Harvard, and Yale) do not use animals to train doctors, and in Canada, several medical schools have adopted similar 
policies including the University of Calgary, the University of Toronto, Queens University, the University o f Laval, 
and the University of Manitoba. Indeed, it is now possible to obtain a medical or veterinary university degree without 
ever killing or dissecting an animal.
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Certainly, there are many potential benefits to students in keeping a classroom pet. 
Students who are shy, isolated, or aggressive may be positively affected by caring for an animal 
(Selby, 1995), all students may experience the therapeutic effects of being around animals and 
being responsible for them (Nahemiak, 2004), and some suggest children’s psychological 
well-being is generally enhanced by having contact with animals (Kellert & Wilson, 1993). 
Beyond that, many children are captivated by animals and genuinely enjoy being in their company. 
From the students’ perspective, then, having a classroom pet may be beneficial in various ways.
It can be a different story for the animals, though, as they are made entirely reliant upon 
their human caretakers and have no choice but to live in an enclosed area which may be noisy, 
busy, stressful, understimulating, or otherwise unsuitable to their needs. Classroom pets also suffer 
the risk of being neglected, mishandled, or mistreated—for example, as Nahemiak (2004) notes, 
children may treat the animals as toys or as human-like babies in need of hugging (a response 
which can scare prey animals).
On account o f this, organizations such as the British Columbia SPCA outline some 
important factors a teacher must consider before adopting a classroom pet, including asking 
themselves why they want to adopt a pet and whether alternative means could be used to achieve
their goals.40 Should they still choose to adopt an animal, 
one of the most important factors is to choose an 
appropriate pet for the classroom. The BC SPCA 
suggests the most appropriate choice is probably a pair 
of same-sex guinea pigs (see Figure 23), followed by 
pairs of gerbils and domestic rats and mice 41 Other
Figure 23: A pair of guinea pigs. responsibilities involved with keeping classroom pets
Source: FreeDigitalPhotos.net
40 Alternative means might include trips to parks, playground walks, visiting speakers, a field trip, videos, films, 
icture books, stories, computer software, or puppets, 
inappropriate animals for classroom pets include turtles (who do best left in their native habitat) and hamsters (who 
are nocturnal and should not be disturbed or handled during the day) (BC SPCA, 2007).
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include providing the animals with the best possible habitat, ensuring they reside in an appropriate 
spot where the temperature is stable and they will have quiet time, caring for their needs 
throughout their lifetime (and having a realistic picture of the costs of doing so), committing to 
being the principal caregiver to the animals (which includes caring for them on weekends and 
during holidays), educating students on the proper care of the animals and monitoring students to 
this end, and being prepared to deal with students’ grief should an animal die.
Beyond all of this, the teacher’s responsibility as a humane role model toward the animals 
cannot be understated (BC SPCA, 2007). It is ultimately the teacher who will determine whether 
the experience of keeping a classroom pet sends anthropocentric messages to students or, 
conversely, cultivates in them an appreciation for animals. Teachers must examine their values, 
attitudes, and practices, and consider any mixed messages they may be sending to students. For 
example, if a teacher respects classroom animals but stomps on a spider, or puts off cleaning or 
feeding the animals because of other commitments, or surrenders the animals to a shelter at the end 
of a school year, she or he is sending very mixed messages to students about the value of animals 
and their place in the world.
Education: A Place to Consider Anthropocentrism?
Haying considered some of the ways a curriculum of anthropocentrism may be promoted 
in education, I now turn attention to the question of why I think anthropocentrism should be 
addressed in education. I see this question as nested in a larger philosophical one, and that is, what 
is the purpose of education? I think that addressing the question of the purposes of education is 
important, as it can help to determine the relevance of addressing anthropocentrism in education as 
well as how raising awareness of anthropocentrism might mesh with those purposes.
A corollary question that arises is one concerning the extent to which the educational 
system should mirror the dominant values of the culture (and in doing so, reproduce the cultural
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status quo), and the extent to which it should promote a critical awareness of that cultural status 
quo as being just that: the cultural status quo. To put this another way, is it the purpose of 
education to follow the dominant values of a culture, or is its purpose to raise awareness o f those 
values and prompt students to critically evaluate them, so they can decide for themselves whether 
they find them tenable?
In my opinion, the conscious or unconscious reproduction of the cultural status quo is not 
what education is about, nor what it should be for. Operating from a position of “omissions” or 
“commissions,” as previously discussed, seem to me to be deeply problematic stances for 
education to take because neither position fosters critical inquiry, which I see as being at the root of 
education. When I think of education as a concept, I think of learning new information or 
perspectives and being exposed to new ideas, as well as making connections within my existing 
knowledge base. I think of learning about myself and the world around me, and expanding my 
abilities to understand and perceive myself and that world. In the most basic sense, I think of 
broadening my thoughts, understandings, and perspectives. This, to me, is what education is about.
When I think of anthropocentrism, on the other hand, very different ideas are evoked, as I 
think of a narrowing of the mind in which a person’s thinking or consideration of others is cut off 
at the human boundary. Anthropocentrism, like racism or sexism, evokes a singular, 
uncomplicated perspective: that humans (or in the case of racism and sexism, particular groups of 
humans) are the only ones who ultimately count, and that the worth of those who fall outside the 
select boundaries should only be measured in terms of the benefits they might offer to those in the 
“centre.” The human-centric mindset is therefore characterized by a degree of closed-mindedness, 
which may be exacerbated by a refusal to accept any evidence that runs contrary to anthropocentric 
beliefs, much like a prejudice. The fostering of this kind of thinking is obviously at odds with my 
understanding of education, for contrary to being about learning, anthropocentrism seems to rely 
on a refusal to learn or critically contemplate.
Having said all of this, I don’t think it is safe to assume that most people are critically
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aware of anthropocentrism, as many may have not been presented with an opportunity to consider 
it critically in the first place. This lack of opportunity is no coincidence: as Luke (1999) discusses, 
the various industries that use animals often go to great lengths to minimize or obfuscate 
information about that usage, which results in both a lack of information and a general silence 
about the topic. With these factors working together, combined with the various ways 
anthropocentrism is inscribed in western culture as “natural” and “right,” I don’t think it is 
reasonable to expect that people will suddenly “see it,” or become critically aware of the 
human-centric bias on their own.
Speaking from my own perspective, I know I did not critically question the anthropocentric 
status quo for the first 28 years of my life, until my husband’s decision to stop eating meat brought 
me into contact with information about a world of animal cruelty of which I was previously 
unaware. Suddenly, I found myself questioning my role as a person contributing to the 
anthropocentric framework, and ethical questions surrounding what I consider to be appropriate 
human-animal relations began to surface. I found I was both frightened to learn about humanity’s 
(ab)uses of animals and compelled to learn about them at the same time; the information in books 
such as Singer’s (1975) Animal Liberation struck me as deeply important but also deeply 
disturbing to learn. I persevered through such books as a form of self-education, and this is how I 
began to learn about anthropocentrism.
This education thus took place on my own initiative; for whatever reason the concept of 
human superiority over animals was one I felt the need to explore in depth, difficult and painful as 
it was (and still is) to me. In spite of this difficulty, I have found this education deeply worthwhile, 
for it has opened my eyes to many of the realities of the world concerning animals, as well as the 
many ways that humans enact and perpetuate their perceived superiority. It has illuminated the 
functioning of society through new lenses which I find important to consider; to me not 
considering them now seems like a delusion, for it means a very pervasive facet of our lives 
remains unexamined. In sum, learning about anthropocentrism has taught me much about myself
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and the world around me, and for me this has added up to a rich education.
hooks (1994) makes the point that it is reasonable for students to expect that the knowledge 
they receive in schools will be meaningful and will connect to their lives. As I see it, the study of 
anthropocentrism fulfills both of these criteria, as it can be profoundly meaningful and it connects 
to our lives in various ways, including connections to our thoughts, language, actions, worldview, 
and relationships with other animals.42 I see this last point—our relationships with animals—as 
especially important to consider from an ethical perspective, for as animals are living and dying at 
our hands and for our purposes, do we not at least owe them the consideration of being aware of 
what is happening to them? And, as the ones perpetuating this usage, do we not also owe it to 
ourselves to understand the impacts of our actions? Anthropocentrism is a far from meaningless or 
benign concept; it implicates us, and other animals, in deep material ways.
To sum up, I see anthropocentrism as a matter worthy of consideration in the educational 
system because education, in my opinion, should be about challenging ignorance rather than 
promoting it. I also think that schools are the ideal places for this exploration because they are 
institutions of learning, broadly speaking, and because the study of anthropocentrism is significant, 
meaningful, and connected to students’ lives in various ways. Such consideration is also connected 
to two characteristics often associated with education—critical thinking and caring—which I 
explore next.
Critical thinking.
Critical thinking is one of the most widely discussed issues in contemporary educational 
theory (Hare & Portelli, 2001). I see good reason for this, because the capacity to think critically is 
a highly important skill. It is important because without it, we may become stuck in a process of 
absorbing information without being able to critically appraise it, and this leaves us in a position
42 For a discussion of the meanings students take from learning such information, see Andrzejewski (2003).
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where we are not actively engaging with information on an intellectual or critical level. From an 
educational standpoint critical thinking is also very important because without it, students may fall 
victim to indoctrination, which clearly runs counter to the purposes o f education.
As Socrates famously said, “The unexamined life is not worth living.” This speaks to me of 
the rich insights that can come from philosophical examination, as well as the ways that without 
that examination, our lives can be diminished. I see critical thinking as akin to living that 
“examined life,” as it is a tool we need to partake in that examination. As for what we should 
examine, I return to hooks’ (1994) ideas about what is meaningful and connected to our lives as 
logical starting points.
Critical thinking is also important because it can connect to a form of freedom or, at the 
very least, I think we are less free if we cannot think critically, because without this capacity we are 
less able to make informed, engaged judgments or decisions. This ultimately connects to the 
process that Freire (1970) identified as conscientization—the act of coming to critical 
consciousness—and its connections to personal empowerment and social change. I am in 
agreement with Freire that this conscientization can (and should) be fostered through education, 
and I see the development of critical thinking as a crucial component to this end.
While I think it is important for students to develop critical thinking skills in education, a 
problem that arises for me is the question of how can we be critical about that which we do not 
know, study, engage with, or otherwise consider? In other words, how reliant is critical thinking 
upon being exposed to information, competing discourses, or alternate points of view (Brookfield, 
1987)? As I explored earlier in this chapter there are various anthropocentric silences in education, 
and these silences can make it difficult for students to come to a critical consciousness about the 
topic (if not outright prevent them from thinking about it in the first place). My point here is that it 
is not enough to pay lip service to critical thinking without providing students the information 
required to think critically, and as such it is important to examine the omissions in curricula.
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Strike (1982) discusses his belief that students should be respected as “moral agents.” For 
him, this means teachers must give students information and reasons as to why they are being 
asked to believe that information, but that students reserve the right to make choices for 
themselves and come to their own conclusions. He states that “responsible choice depends on 
information and evidence. One cannot consistently demand that a person make a responsible 
choice and at the same time withhold information relevant to that choice” (1982, pp. 43-44). In 
regard to my research, I see a withholding of sorts that is going on in education in relation to 
anthropocentrism, and it is one that hinders students’ abilities to make responsible choices as 
informed moral agents.
This withholding of information is at odds with critical thinking and can lead to the 
perpetuation of bias or prejudice. As Siegel (1997) states, holding a prejudice is a violation of 
critical thinking because prejudices are by nature “protected from, or guarded against, reflection” 
(p. 179). In relation to anthropocentrism, this evokes to me a circular process, whereby critical 
thinking is essential to studying our perceptions or biases, but without exposure to appropriate 
information critical thinking is hindered in the first place, and on account o f that hindrance our 
perceptions and biases remain unexamined and untouched. This is a loop that can continue forever, 
but as I have discussed, it is not congruent with the concept of education for it to do so.
Caring.
There is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all of its manifestations.
(Whitehead, 1929/1967, p. 6)
Caring— about life in all of its manifestations—strikes me as a facet that, like critical 
thinking, should be fundamental to education. I see caring as essential to education in a general 
sense because, as discussed in Chapter 3, humans are an interdependent species by nature, and as 
such caring is part of what it is to be human. Not caring, by contrast, would seem to entail a
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counterproductive attempt to separate the mind from the emotions (which I am not convinced can 
be achieved in the first place), and so from this reasoning it seems natural that schools be places 
where caring relationships exist.
There are also many good reasons, from students’ perspectives, for schools to be caring 
environments. For example, Noddings (1988) suggests an ethic of caring in education can help 
students to establish a sense of safety, trust, and collaboration, all of which are needed for them to 
pursue the challenges of education. Selby (1995) echoes this idea, suggesting that students who do 
not feel confident or cared for may be unwilling to extend themselves or take risks in learning new 
material. Further, Lewis, Schaps, and Watson (1996) find a range of positive outcomes associated 
with caring relationships in schools, including higher student achievement, an increased 
motivation to learn, a greater interest in school, and fewer behavioural problems. From an 
educational standpoint, then, there are various reasons why a culture of caring in education is in 
students’ best interests, as it can connect intimately with their self-perceptions and learning 
processes.
Establishing caring relationships, between teachers and students and among students 
themselves, is also important because schools are helping to develop the “citizens of tomorrow,” 
so to speak. These citizens are inheriting a world with a long list of complicated problems, 
including environmental exploitation and devastation, economic elitism and poverty, warfare, 
terrorism, human slavery, animal exploitation, nationalism, ethnocentrism, and so on—and as 
such not caring, or teaching through the hidden curriculum that caring is not important or valued, is 
clearly not an appropriate solution unless we wish to ultimately contribute to the lifespan o f these 
problems.
For all o f these reasons, it makes little sense for schools to not encourage caring 
relationships or to focus solely on the cognitive elements of education while ignoring or repressing 
those associated with care. I am thus in agreement with philosophers of education who see the 
importance of caring in education, but this leaves open the question of whom we should care about
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in education: should caring be reserved for the human community? Or, as I am exploring in this 
thesis, should we extend care to animals, and if so, why?
To risk answering a question with a question, my answer is: why not? Why shouldn ’t we 
care about animals? Under what pretenses do we reserve caring for the human community? In my 
opinion, cutting off our caring abilities at the human species makes caring, as a concept, incoherent, 
for many people do claim to care about animals, or at the very least do not wish for animals to 
suffer or be abused, and as such truncating the focus of caring at human concerns alone makes no 
sense.43 It is also inconsistent with the principle of caring itself, and by not discussing care in the 
educational system as it applies to human-animal relations that inconsistency remains 
unchallenged. In Chapter 2 I considered some rationalizations of anthropocentrism or reasons that 
may be forwarded to stop our caring at the human species, but as I discussed, these rationalizations 
are not particularly compelling or satisfying.44 On the simple grounds that there is no satisfactory 
answer as to why animals are not worthy of our consideration or care, I think that caring for 
animals should be a part of education.
Resisting Anthropocentrism as Critical Pedagogy?
In this final section I wish to examine the relationship between anthropocentrism and 
critical pedagogy, a body of theory and a practice of teaching concerned with helping students to 
recognize and challenge prevailing forms of dominance (Wikipedia, 2007b). Critical pedagogy 
raises questions about the power relationships between those at the margins and those in the centre, 
and in doing so attempts to educate for social equity (Giroux, 1992). Critical pedagogues 
recognize that education is not a neutral process but is one inscribed with power, and by critically
43 For example, a 2003 poll conducted by ICR Survey Research Group found that two-thirds of people agreed that an 
animal’s right to live free of suffering is just as important as the right for a human to live free of suffering (ICR Survey
Research Group, 2003).
44
One reason that is perhaps more satisfying, but ultimately still anthropocentric, is that caring for animals is 
important because it can lead to caring for other human beings (see Ascione, 1993).
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examining social norms, values, and structures they aim to help students come to a critical 
consciousness about power and its functionings (Kincheloe, 2005).
As I hope is clear by now from my previous discussions, I see many of these tenets (some 
of which I have already discussed) as supporting my understanding that the study of 
anthropocentrism and human-animal relations fit well as categories of analysis and consideration 
in a critical pedagogy approach to education. I outline some of these connections in more detail 
below:
Foundational tenets of 
critical pedagogy
How the consideration of anthropocentrism and human-animal relations 
connects to foundational tenets of critical pedagogy
Identifying and challenging 
forms of dominance
Anthropocentrism is a pervasive form of human dominance over animals. 
That dominance may be minimized, trivialized, or otherwise disregarded, 
but it exists nonetheless and has implications for all living beings.
Concern with uneven power 
distribution and resulting 
oppression/suffering
Anthropocentrism results in deep power differentials between humans and 
animals and vast animal suffering. Suffering is suffering, regardless of the 
species it affects, and as such it makes no sense to cut off our concern at the 
human species.
Grounded in a vision of 
social justice
A social justice that excludes animals is not one that is particularly “just” at 
all, as it denies billions of animals consideration of their basic needs. Surely 
a vision of justice can do better than this?
Recognizing that education 
is inherently political
Omissions in curricula constitute a political agenda, making 
anthropocentrism a political matter worthy of consideration.
Examining social norms, 
values, and structures
Anthropocentrism qualifies as a social norm, value, and structure, and a 
pervasive one at that. As such, it is worth examining.
Educating for the 
development of students’ 
critical consciousness
No one can expect to be critically conscious of that which is not discussed. 
Students are denied an opportunity to develop a particular form o f critical 
consciousness if anthropocentrism and human-animal relations are not 
integrated as topics of critical inquiry.
Figure 24: Interconnections: Critical pedagogy and the study of anthropocentrism.
The above chart outlines some of the foundational connections I see between critical 
pedagogy and the study or challenging of anthropocentrism, and why I see it as important for 
critical pedagogy approaches to education (and indeed all critical discourses) to examine 
prevailing ideas about human-centrism. As I have attempted to demonstrate so far in this thesis,
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anthropocentrism is a pervasive mindset with significant consequences, and as such it deserves 
critical attention. It should no longer be relegated to the realm of the private or the unspoken; it 
should be addressed and considered critically, along with all of the complicated questions it raises.
Despite the various connections outlined in Figure 24, Bell and Russell (2000) note that a 
humanism remains inscribed in critical pedagogy as “humans are assumed to be free agents 
separate from and pitted against the rest of nature” (p. 193). This takes place while significant 
amounts of scholarship emerging from the critical discourses focus on understanding and resisting 
human biases and prejudices, such as sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and 
oppressions related to age, size, income level, religion, and national identity. Further, as evidenced 
by coalition-building between movements, it is often recognized within critical theory that 
different forms of oppression intersect, and consequently attempts are made to understand multiple 
forms of oppression at once (e.g., Gaard, 1997; Weber, 2000).
In general, much less has been said in critical pedagogy about anthropocentrism and 
human-animal relations. Animals are often outright ignored in critical theorizing, or they may be 
merely implied in it through what Russell (2005) calls the “and so forth” category, that is, the 
catch-all category theorists may evoke to encompass unmentioned “others,” although this often 
amounts to no more than a glossing over of those “others” with no foundational consideration 
given to them. While I recognize that the analysis of animals as a category adds new depths of 
complexity to critical theorizing, ignoring animals or relegating them to the “and so forth” 
category are not appropriate solutions. What is needed is a balance, one that allows space for 
understandings about the linkages between the oppression of humans and the oppression of 
animals to emerge, while also recognizing the often vast differences between humans and animals, 
and positioning animals in their own category of analysis as appropriate.
This is a complicated task, but it is not one outside the purview or capacities of critical 
pedagogy. As hooks (1994) acknowledges, critical pedagogy is not easy: it is taxing, it is a form of 
political activism, and the choice to challenge the status quo can have negative consequences. It
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also requires ongoing critical thinking and engagement. These ideas apply directly to the 
challenging of anthropocentrism, which is, as I have discussed, not a topic that a critical pedagogy 
approach to education should ignore, but rather one that should be engaged in all of its complexity.
In this chapter I have attempted to outline some of the ways I see education, as a system, 
being silent about anthropocentrism and therefore perpetuating it, as well as why I believe that this 
perpetuation is unwarranted. I have also attempted to outline some of the ways I see the study of 
anthropocentrism as connected to a critical pedagogy approach to education, which is one I believe 
is vitally important to enable students to become critically conscious people who more fully 
understand themselves and others in the world around them. I consider some educational 
responses or strategies toward this critical consideration next.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Educational Responses to Anthropocentrism
My goal in this chapter is to transition from the largely theoretical discussion of the last 
chapter into the realm of praxis, or the blend of theory and practice, to discuss some educational 
responses to anthropocentrism. A final question I wish to explore in this thesis is how educators 
might help to foster a critical consciousness of this mindset among students, or how education 
might disrupt anthropocentrism. To this end, I will outline some ideas and discuss their potential, 
as well as some challenges associated with them.
I should state at the outset that the ideas I present here comprise a very small sampling of 
many possible responses, and I discuss them in a general way, without providing specific details as 
to how they might be organized or customized to suit different age groups. Later in the chapter I 
outline some resources that offer more specific and detailed suggestions, but my general vision for 
this chapter is to present some ideas, or the genesis of some ideas, that could be further developed 
as needed.
I should also clarify that in suggesting these ideas I am not trying to imply that students 
should be told what to think about anthropocentrism, but rather that they should be provided an 
opportunity to critically engage with the concept in the first place. This is an important distinction 
to make in the context of education, as it speaks to the difference between indoctrination and 
education. While indoctrination involves telling students what to think, without allowing them the 
freedom to be critical of the information presented or to come to their own conclusions, education 
entails providing students with information and allowing them to respond to it, and question it, on 
their own (cf. Hare, 2001; Strike, 1982). With this in mind, I am by no means trying to dictate what 
student responses to anthropocentrism “should” be—in fact, given the complexity of 
anthropocentrism and human-animal relations, as well as the sometimes politically charged nature
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
80
of these categories, I would expect student responses may be multiple and varied.
And so, I present here some ideas for educators to consider in broaching the topic of 
anthropocentrism. After presenting these ideas I give some attention to the question of where they 
might fit into primary or secondary schools’ curricula, and I discuss two possibilities: (1) through a 
curriculum of humane education, and (2) through integration in existing subject areas. Finally, I 
consider some challenges that may arise with the integration of this material, and how those 
challenges might be contextualized.
Educational Responses
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, through an anthropocentric mindset animals’ needs are 
often erased from moral consideration or relegated to the margins of that consideration. A key 
point of disrupting human-centrism therefore rests on moving animals from that marginalized 
position toward the moral “centre,” or conversely diffusing that centre so that it is not an 
exclusively human terrain. This notion, of moving from margins to centre, is a familiar one within 
discussions of social justice, as attention is often given to identifying and dismantling barriers that 
keep various social groups in marginalized positions and with limited power (Giroux, 1992; hooks, 
1984).
The application of this idea is not as straightforward when it comes to animals, however,45 
because animals (with some very rare exceptions, such as Koko the gorilla, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2) cannot join in on these discussions in the first place, and even if  they could it is quite 
possible that the conceptualization of such ideas would be outside their capacities. It is therefore 
not reasonable to expect that animals will simply “emancipate” themselves or raise awareness in 
others about their marginalized positions. Here, the differences between humans and animals
This is not to imply that this process is “straightforward” for any oppressed group, as inequities and power relations 
are often built into systems insidiously (Foucault, 1977).
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preclude animals (and anthropocentrism by extension) from being simply added on to a social 
justice agenda, and instead point to the need for a more complicated and nuanced perspective to be 
adopted (Russell, 2005). To put this another way, while in some ways anthropocentrism can be 
linked to other forms of oppression (some similarities were explored, for example, in the 
ecofeminist section of Chapter 3), there are also significant differences between it and other forms 
of oppression, which makes a blanket approach to the problem unfeasible. Singer (1975) speaks to 
these notable differences as he outlines three challenges the animal liberation movement faces: 
animals cannot speak for themselves,46 humans benefit from the use of animals, and humans are in 
the habit of using animals.
On account of these reasons, a step over the conceptual human-animal divide needs to be 
initiated, in a significant way, by humans. This initiation is in turn predicated on consideration or 
engagement with the ideas in the first place, as well as a willingness to challenge the pervasive 
silence that often surrounds anthropocentrism. To counter that silence and to engage in that 
consideration, I suggest the following ideas which could be undertaken by educators, students, or 
the two together.
Exploring alternative discourses.
Anthropocentrism is by no means the only viewpoint available to us, nor is it one that is 
universally adopted. Even within western culture, where anthropocentrism is arguably the 
dominant mode of thinking (Plumwood, 1996), it is contested by alternative discourses about 
humans, animals, and their perceived “places” in the world. One educational response would 
therefore be to discuss, write about, represent, role play, or otherwise consider and express ideas of
46 Although, I don’t want to take animals’ agency away here; I think that they do communicate in their own varied 
ways, but those ways may either not be recognized by humans or may be negated with the assertion that we cannot 
ever really know how an animal is feeling. Bekoff (2002) suggests such assertions remain prominent in scientific 
circles, where it may be argued, for example, that we cannot know if an animal feels pain. (Technically, o f course, the 
same assertion could be made about a human.)
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these alternative discourses.
In Chapter 3 I outlined three discourses that pose a challenge to human-centrism: animal 
liberation/animal rights, ecofeminism, and poststructuralist thought. Each of these bodies of 
theory raises questions about human identity and the expressions of human power in conjunction 
with animals (either directly or indirectly), and in doing so each offers new ways of thinking about 
human-animal relations. Each thus holds the potential to destabilize taken-for-granted notions 
about humans and animals, and correspondingly each could provide a means for contesting 
anthropocentrism.
These are not, of course, the only discourses that could be considered in an educational 
context: I think it could also be generative to consider bodies of theory that start from an 
understanding of humans as embedded in nature, as opposed to being conceptually “above” it, 
outside of it, or in control of it. Here I am thinking of discourses such as ecocentrism (Eckersley, 
1992), biocentrism (Bonnett, 1997), and deep ecology (Drengson & Inoue, 1995), which all 
proceed from a philosophical position in which all beings are considered to have inherent worth, 
irrespective of their usefulness to humans. Through such perspectives, where humans are not 
necessarily privileged above animals, a focus is placed on the ecological whole and the 
interconnections among all forms of life on earth. Such perspectives, especially if taken as starting 
points for how we see the world, can drastically challenge anthropocentrism.
Aboriginal and Inuit perspectives, stories, 
and artwork (see Figure 25) can also offer 
perspectives beyond anthropocentrism. While I 
am reluctant to generalize the ideas of such a 
diversity of peoples and perspectives, themes 
like the blurring of the divide between humans, 
animals, and spirits are prevalent, as are 
perspectives where relationships are valued over
Figure 25: “The Plains” by A1 Manybears. 
Source: MorgueFile, 2007.
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dichotomy, all of nature is seen as infused with spirit, and animals are considered to have spirits 
and consciousness. In such perspectives humans are by no means at the centre, but rather are seen 
as one part of a larger, animate whole (Cruikshank, 2004; George & Himschall, 2004).
Considering these worldviews or discourses can open up alternatives to anthropocentrism. 
While it is beyond my purview to explore these ideas in this thesis (and certainly others are much 
more qualified to do so), my point is simply that many different viewpoints are available to us, and 
by exploring them and creating ways for students to engage with them, anthropocentrism can be 
critically examined.
Exploring the diverse lives o f animals.
Human superiority is ... a lie. Gorillas are stronger yet gentler than humans, cheetahs 
swifter and more graceful, dolphins more playful and exuberant. Bees who perceive 
ultraviolet light and dance a message of angle and distance; fish who simultaneously see 
above, below, forward, and behind while swimming through endlessly varied tropical 
color; birds who navigate over hemispheres, sensing the earth’s magnetic field and soaring 
in rhythm with their flocks; sea turtles who, over decades, experience vast stretches of 
ocean—what wisdom and vision are theirs? Other animals have other ways of knowing.
(Dunayer, 1995, p. 23)
Learning about animals and their “other ways of knowing” can be fascinating, and the 
seemingly infinite diversities among animals make such an exploration virtually limitless. The 
scope for such an exploration can also be taken in countless directions and through various levels 
of intensity, making it customizable to students of all ages. Learning about animals can work 
toward interrupting anthropocentrism because it involves a consideration of the world beyond the 
human, which is an important first step47 in coming to care about animals in a way beyond simply
47 Although not necessarily a direct one—see Russell (1999).
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considering their usefulness to humans (Goodall & Bekoff, 2002).
And certainly, an intriguing world of animals abounds! For example, in the past couple of 
months, I have been fascinated to see the newly “discovered” blonde-haired crustacean, the Kiwi 
hirsuta, a lobster-like creature living in hydrothermal vents of the South Pacific sea floor (see 
Figure 26) (CBC News, 2006). I have also been surprised to learn that a female Komodo dragon 
(see Figure 27) in a Chester, England zoo, having never been exposed to a male, has recently
produced a “virgin birth” of five hatchlings—an 
amazing story from a member of an endangered species 
(Associated Press, 2007)! On a more light-hearted front, 
I was amused to learn recently how lemurs and capuchin 
monkeys will use millipedes as recreational drugs. As 
Balcombe (2006) describes, the primates will gently bite 
the body of a millipede, who in response exudes 
defensive chemicals; the primates will then take turns 
rubbing the millipede on their skin. This causes them to 
enter a trance-like state for about 20 minutes, complete 
with glassy eyes and drooling, after which they will drop 
the millipede to the ground, usually unharmed. The 
world beyond the humans is certainly a rich one, and 
while the point is not to turn animals into spectacles, 
there are plenty of intriguing and entertaining stories 
about them!
Books such as The Pleasurable Kingdom: 
Animals and the Nature o f  Feeling Good (Balcombe, 2006); When Elephants Weep: The 
Emotional Lives o f Animals (Masson & McCarthy, 1996), and Good Natured: The Origins o f  
Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (de Waal, 1996) provide enriching fodder for
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crustacean.
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Figure 27: A Komodo dragon. 
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such an exploration. They are devoted to story after story about animals, who indeed do seem to 
display, to greater or lesser degrees and in their own varied ways, all of those characteristics 
Darwin (1871/1976) surmised they felt: pleasure, pain, anxiety, grief, dejection, despair, joy, love, 
devotion, ill-temper, sulkiness, determination, anger, disdain, contempt, disgust, guilt, pride, 
helplessness, patience, surprise, astonishment, fear, horror, shame, shyness, and modesty. In doing 
so, they demonstrate how the master narratives supporting anthropocentrism, such as the idea that 
nature is homogenously “red in tooth and claw,” are so very superficial.
The ways in which animals’ lives could be explored in an educational setting are virtually 
limitless, be it through telling or listening to stories about animals, illustrating such stories, 
researching a particular animal and sharing the results, watching nature programs, role playing 
stories about animals, and so on. Given the enormous scope of stories to be told, the possibilities 
are only constrained by one’s imagination!
Animal encounters.
Spending time with an animal or animals, or 
being outdoors and being in the company of animals, 
are obvious ways anthropocentrism can be, quite 
literally, disrupted. In Chapter 4 I mentioned some 
possible means for animal encounters in an 
educational context, such as keeping “pet” animals 
in the classroom, going on field trips to learn about 
animals, or simply spending time observing or being
with an animal (see Figure 28). All of these “animal encounters” can provide means ol coming to 
learn about and appreciate animals, and—depending on how they are undertaken and the level of 
student involvement—can provide powerful catalysts for disrupting anthropocentrism.
Figure 28: An animal encounter. 
Source: Can Stock Photo, 2007.
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This is not to say that having contact with an animal equates to a transcendence of 
anthropocentrism. Dewey (1938) made the point that while learning occurs by experience, not all 
experiences are educative ones: “An experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote 
the formation of a ... careless attitude ... It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, 
nor even of activity in experience. Everything depends on the quality of the experience which is 
had” (pp. 26-27). This quality, according to Dewey, can be measured by its effects on later 
experiences toward learning, or the manner in which students can build on their experience in the 
future. Some learning experiences may in fact be uneducative, he suggests—and in relation to my 
research, I see this as true: not all experiences will be helpful in coming to understand 
anthropocentrism. In other words, while we can all have (and do have) “animal encounters,” this 
does not mean we will automatically become critical of anthropocentrism in doing so.
Russell’s (1999) research into whalewatchers’ experiences exemplifies the lack of a 
straight connection between having a nature experience and coming to care or act on behalf of 
another species. In querying whether whalewatching might help the whale conservation 
movement, Russell found the assumption of a linear progression between animal encounters and 
commitment or action to be false. This idea applies to my topic as well, although it is complicated 
at the same time because I don’t want to dismiss that for some people (I am thinking of young 
people in particular), connecting with an animal may have a much greater impact than working 
with representations of animals or discussing them as abstract categories.
Ultimately, then, I think it’s important to proceed cautiously around the idea that animal 
encounters equate to a challenging of anthropocentrism, but at the same time, they could hold that 
potential. With a nod to Dewey (1938), perhaps what is important is for such experiences to be 
“educative” ones, as well as ones in which an authentic interaction between people and animals 
can take place. Weston (1994) suggests that such interactions occur when animals are recognized 
as subjective beings who have a point of view: “What ‘connection’ with other animals ultimately 
requires is a set of practices and comportments that invites connection, that approaches them as
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co-inhabitants of a shared world from the start; by taking them seriously as creatures who have a 
point of view, and by ... paying attention” (p. 153).
Paying attention to animals does not always require having actual encounters with them, 
though; these encounters can also take place in students’ imaginations. Fawcett (2006) speaks to 
the importance of keeping animals alive in our ethical imaginations, and there is virtually no limit 
of stimulating materials that might assist to this end. Some possibilities include stories, as 
previously discussed, but also images, artwork, photos, audio recordings of animals, videos of 
animals, and so on.
Of course, another caveat is needed here regarding animal representations, for we can’t 
assume that hanging a poster of an animal in a classroom, for example, equates to a critical 
consideration of anthropocentrism! Certainly, the nature of animal representations, as well as how 
they are discussed or engaged with, matters, as many such representations may do little to 
challenge the anthropocentric status quo. Baker (2001) makes the point that all animal 
representations—whether in photos, artwork, or told in stories—are ultimately human 
constructions; we, as humans, create the animals we depict. This points to a need to be critical in 
considering animal representations and to scrutinize the (human) constructions of them—which 
could be a productive learning activity in itself, especially among older students.
Vance (1995) discusses the narrative construction of animals in her article, “Beyond 
Just-So Stories: Narrative, Animals, and Ethics.” Too often, she suggests, stories construct animals 
as “good” (e.g., songbirds, pets), “bad” (e.g., bears, mountain lions), or inconsequential (e.g., frogs, 
insects), and these constructions feed into an anthropocentric dialogue. To counter this, she 
proposes four criteria for narratives that disrupt utilitarian and anthropocentric depictions of 
animals. Such narratives, she suggests, should (1) be ecologically appropriate to a time and place, 
giving plausible roles to animals and not presenting them solely as resources awaiting human use; 
(2) be ethically appropriate, rejecting the notion that any part of the world exists for the use and 
pleasure o f another part; (3) give voice to those whose stories are being told (as an example, she
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suggests that in a story of a wolf hunt, the hunter’s 
story should not be centralized over the story of 
the wolf); and (4) make us care. Here, she evokes 
what Ruddick (1989) calls “attentive love, the
Figure 29: Multiple narratives?
Following Vance’s (1995) criteria, at least three 
stories may be embedded in this picture: that of 
the hunter, the dog, and the dead bird.
Source: Animal Picture Society, 2007.
habit of asking ‘What are you going through?’ and 
waiting for the answer” (Vance, 1995, p. 184). In 
my opinion, these are excellent criteria for
narratives that move beyond anthropocentrism, 
and could also inform analyses of other animal 
representations (see Figure 29).
We can thus have animal encounters in various ways; some can do little to nothing to 
challenge anthropocentrism, while others may involve overcoming the Cartesian view of animals 
as lacking in subjective experience in seeing them, in Regan’s words, as “subjects-of-a-life” (1983, 
p. 243). This may involve stretching our imaginations or developing empathy toward animals, or 
perhaps asking ourselves the simple question of how they might be feeling or experiencing the 
world. I don’t think this is a particularly difficult thing to do (certainly, pet owners seem to do it all 
the time), but it may require a guided perspective from educators to ensure that such experiences, 
whether they involve actual animals or evoke them in students’ imaginations, are educative ones.
Self-reflection.
Following Vance’s (1995) criteria that an appropriate ethic is one that gives attention to all 
relevant parties, part of coming to understand anthropocentrism entails self-reflection. While 
human-centrism might be disrupted by exploring alternative worldviews, learning about animals, 
and/or having experiences with them, another key strategy involves looking inward and 
considering our own beliefs, values, and lifestyles in relation to animals. After all, since
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anthropocentrism involves an attitude of humans at the centre, it makes sense to consider that 
centre from a personal perspective.48
Such introspection may well reveal, for many people, that anthropocentrism is far from a 
blanket attitude in regard to human-animal relations. Since the ways humans disregard animals are 
often silenced, the ways we regard them, respect them, and love them tend to receive much more 
attention. While I have not spent much time in this thesis addressing the feelings of kinship 
humans often hold toward animals, there is a rich tradition here as countless people have great love 
and/or respect for them. For example, many companion animals are loved and cared for 
throughout their lives, and many organizations exist to care for animals directly (e.g., animal 
shelters, veterinarian services) and/or indirectly (e.g., animal welfare and rights groups, 
conservation groups). In some cases, people will go to great lengths to rescue random animals 
from dire situations—more than once I have seen people canoe out, through precarious and 
partially frozen waters, to rescue a duck stuck in ice in the lake near my parents’ home, for 
example. Clearly, in some contexts, and toward certain animals, people display a great deal of 
compassion.49
Delving deeper into an autobiographical search may reveal more complicated or 
contradictory attitudes held toward animals. About five years ago in my own life, an 
autobiographical search revealed to me that my interactions with animals were very mixed: there 
were some animals I loved, admired, and mythologized, while others I disliked, feared, or 
considered to be “pests.” Yet other animals I ate, dissected, or wore their skins, and these animals 
I didn’t consider at all: they were invisible to me, even though I had a relationship of sorts with 
them. This autobiographical search thus proved very insightful, and I think that such reflections, 
especially if done in the context of other strategies, can destabilize anthropocentrism by bringing 
to the surface, and calling into question, the cultural scripts we hold in relation to animals.
48
This idea, concerning the importance of looking inward, is also found in anti-racist work where the need for white
people to examine their whiteness and identify their privilege is stressed (e.g., Bishop, 2002).
49
For a critical case study of humans reacting to and rescuing trapped whales, see Clayton (1998).
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Much like the previously discussed ideas, self-reflection can take place in myriad ways and 
be customized to various age groups. It can range from simple expressions of one’s relationships 
toward specific animals to deeper autobiographical searches that are perhaps shared and discussed 
with others. This process can prompt thinking about animals and thinking about the relationships 
we hold toward them, and in doing so can open up these relationships to a critical consideration.
Incorporating Responses into the Curriculum
Having now discussed some general ideas, I will address the question of where they might 
be incorporated into the curriculum. Three possibilities present themselves: (1) they could stand on 
their own, in a course developed to explore anthropocentrism, (2) they could be incorporated into a 
curriculum of humane education, or (3) they could be infused into existing subject areas. All three 
of these options hold potential, in my opinion, as they all provide means of engaging with the 
concept, but it is the latter two I will focus on as these seem most feasible at this time. Given that 
the first option would necessitate curriculum development, it doesn’t seem particularly promising 
at this time,50 but the other two options are more feasible as materials already exist for 
implementation, and to some extent a precedent has already been set for them. I explore these two 
possibilities next.
Humane education.
Humane education is a wide-reaching field of education that makes connections between 
human, animal, and environmental forms of social justice. Its overarching purpose is to raise 
critical awareness about, and educate for, a more humane world, and to do so it addresses values 
and behaviours that connect to oppression, suffering, and planetary destruction (Selby, 1995; Weil,
50 Although, such a course would certainly not be out of place in a university setting, where there seems to be growing 
interest and course selections in the field of animal studies.
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2004). Humane education is therefore extremely wide in scope and draws from a range of fields 
including human rights, animal rights and welfare, environmental ethics, peace studies, 
anti-discriminatory education, moral education, and social justice movements in general.51
Humane education emerged from the efforts of humane societies and animal protection 
groups. Selby (2000) notes that in Canada, humane education emerged in the 1870s as humane 
societies were formed, which had mandates encompassing animal protection and child protection, 
and that focused on fostering humane sentiments toward animals through education in schools. In 
America, humane education emerged in the late 1800s from animal protectionists’ efforts to instill 
empathy for animals in children, and to strengthen the animal welfare movement (Antoncic, 2003). 
It also arose in conjunction with character education, on account of a recognized connection 
between violence toward animals and violence toward humans, and it was envisioned that the two 
forms of education in tandem could help shape students into democratic, humane citizens 
(Antoncic, 2003).
Implicitly, then, humane education includes a focus on animal protectionism, as well as 
other areas relating to animals, human-animal relations, and anthropocentrism. To list some of 
those areas as published in two contemporary books on humane education—Earthkind: A 
Teacher’s Handbook on Humane Education (Selby, 1995) and The Power and Promise o f  
Humane Education (Weil, 2004)—humane education involves lessons and activities related to 
learning about animal needs, pet care, the similarities and differences between humans and 
animals, media images of animals, animal adjectives, vegetarianism, hunting, trapping, fishing, 
animal experimentation, dissection, factory farming, circuses, zoos, the animal welfare and rights 
movement, land usage and its effects on animals, and human-wildlife relations (and this is not an
Weil (2004) suggests a one-year humane education course might comprise of five units: human rights (addressing 
prejudice, modern-day slavery, sweatshop labour, political oppression, poverty); cultural issues (media analysis and 
corporate influences); environmental preservation (pollution, habitat destruction, resource depletion, global warming, 
and human overpopulation); animal protection (the uses of animals for food, clothing, testing, companionship, and 
entertainment); and “connections, conflicts, and meaningful solutions” (p. 117) related to all of the above.
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exhaustive list). In addition to the animal-related topics, other areas pertaining to human and 
environmental justice are also explored in depth.
While the focus of humane education extends beyond the scope of my research, I think it 
offers an excellent venue for a critical consideration of anthropocentrism. Its widened scope is, in 
fact, in many ways beneficial, for it makes sense to explore multiple forms of oppression in tandem 
because there are many points of interconnection among them. Of course, in keeping with my 
focus on anthropocentrism I would not want the “human agenda” to usurp the other areas o f focus 
within humane education, or for the “animal agenda” to become an afterthought or add on, but this 
hardly seems to be the case. As Weil (2004) states, following a discussion of what humane 
education could look like in practice:
Humane education, unlike other forms of social justice or environmental education, 
includes the plight of individual animals and invites students to explore our obligations and 
responsibilities toward them .... If I ’ve belabored the issue of animal protection here, it is 
because animal issues are generally neglected in education, even in sustainability 
education, environmental education, character education, social justice education, and 
media literacy education, (p. 49)
While humane education curricula offer a valuable means for exploring anthropocentrism, 
my optimism for it is tempered by the fact that it is a marginalized area of study, if  it is represented 
at all. Selby (2000) notes there is currently no mandated implementation of humane education in 
schools in Canada, and its lack of success m aybe due to various factors: a lack of available 
resources, a lack of funding on the part of humane societies to create such resources, the perception 
that it is not a valuable subject, and the “back to basics” climate of education that emerged in the 
1990s. Whatever the reason(s), it has not, as of yet, taken hold in a Canadian context.
And yet, it appears that interest in the field is growing. Academic research related to
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humane education has increased significantly since 1984,52 there are numerous websites devoted 
to it, and in 1996 the Maine-based International Institute of Humane Education was launched, 
offering a certification program and a master’s degree in humane education. In general, humane 
education seems to have a stronger hold in America than in Canada, as thirteen states have humane 
education laws that endorse the importance of educating for the humane treatment of animals and 
the preservation o f the environment, and in nine of those states humane education is mandatory 
(Antoncic, 2003). In New York City there is a full humane education curriculum in place in the 
elementary years (Antoncic, 2003), and in California a humane education charter school, which 
promotes humane living in addition to teaching the standard subjects, has been launched (Weil, 
2004). Given these milestones, it appears that humane education is a growing movement, and I 
would think that its subject matter, which addresses some of the most pressing ethical and 
environmental issues of our time, may well be considered important enough for inclusion in the 
educational system in the future. Whether this will occur through a humane education curriculum, 
or via integration in existing subject areas, remains to be seen.
Infusion across the curriculum.
Given the current status of humane education in Canada, a more optimistic fit for a 
consideration of anthropocentrism and human-animal relations might be for this content to be 
infused into existing subject areas. This would likely lead to a more watered-down focus than 
would otherwise be undertaken in a humane education curriculum, but at the same time there are 
many opportunities for this infusion across subject areas without compromising the focus o f the 
subjects themselves.
The previously discussed humane education books (Selby, 1995; Weil, 2004) outline
52 Evidence for this is provided by the two versions of the “Annotated Bibliography of Research Relevant to Humane 
Education” published by the National Association for Humane and Environmental Education. The first bibliography, 
published in 1984, is 10 pages long; while the second bibliography, which is undated but outlines research published 
between 1985-2001, is 37 pages long.
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numerous ways such content could be incorporated into existing classes. A very truncated list of 
their suggestions include: inquiring into the arguments for and against animal testing (science); 
analyzing themes of fairness, rights, and responsibilities as they relate to animals (social studies); 
interpreting statistics pertaining to human exploitation of animals (mathematics); investigating the 
geography of animal use locally (geography); studying how the agricultural revolutions impacted 
farm animals (history); creative writing on animal-related topics (English); exploring animal 
welfare and animal rights arguments (philosophy); studying conventions that artists used to depict 
animals in different time periods (art); discussing or role playing around animal-related issues to 
increase communication abilities (English as a second language); making animal recordings and 
incorporating them into compositions (music); movement sessions based on the movements of 
particular animals (physical education); comparing and contrasting vegetarian and omnivorous 
diets (health class); and considering the economics of intensive farming practices versus 
free-range ones (economics). While not all of these suggestions are appropriate for all ages, many 
could be customized to different age groups, and many other suggestions are provided that target 
younger or older students specifically. The intensity and complexity of the activities are also 
customizable; they could be incorporated at a shallow level or could be intensified to become 
long-term or community projects.
The subject of language arts may be particularly compatible with an exploration of 
anthropocentrism, given its focus on reading, writing, reflecting, and responding to various texts. 
Language arts also provides a good fit on account of the various ways language constructs, 
constrains, or negates animals from consideration (as explored in Chapters 2 and 3). Bell and 
Russell (1999) outline a list of recommendations for how language arts instruction could disrupt 
anthropocentrism by encouraging students to “bear witness to other life” (p. 74); some of their 
suggestions include asking students to keep a nature journal and record observations or 
interactions with an animal or plant over time (for younger classes, one journal could be kept per 
class), evaluating misconceptions and stereotypes about animals through a true or false activity,
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exploring linguistic metaphors associated with animals, acknowledging differing forms of 
human-animal relations in different cultures and time periods, and drawing attention to the links 
between lifestyle choices and ecocide/biocide.
Stout (2001) suggests both the language and visual arts may be appropriate venues for 
teaching students to care about the world beyond the human. Motivated by an incident in which 
she witnessed a student kicking a dog and other students laughing about it, Stout began 
incorporating into her arts courses instructional units aimed at “stimulating students’ imagination, 
developing empathetic awareness, and instilling the capacity to care” (p. 84). Using art forms from 
different times and cultures to evoke empathy and imagination, she reformed her curriculum and 
found that students demonstrated modest, but clear results that they were becoming more curious, 
more willing to listen to others’ ideas, and more expressive of their own thoughts. As a result of 
this, she suggests the arts provide a good venue for exploring others’ subjectivities in meaningful 
ways.
This is just a limited sampling of ways a curriculum could be infused with material that 
engages students with the concept of anthropocentrism and promotes consideration of 
human-animal relations. This is not to say that each suggestion will lead to a transcendence of 
anthropocentrism, but they may offer some beginning steps in that direction.
As a final note to this section, I want to acknowledge that the integration of many o f these 
ideas may well be easier said than done, on a few levels. First, many educators may find that they 
require an education on these topics themselves, which can be difficult because such information is 
sometimes silenced, suppressed, or otherwise dismissed as unimportant. This can make finding 
information a challenge. Second, the resources pertaining to these topics are limited, which again 
can mean work for educators in finding the resources, or adapting them or creating their own. And 
third, there is the ongoing problem of time constraints, and the challenge of trying to fit yet more
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material into already busy schedules.
There is also, I think, a possible challenge at a deeper emotional level. Delving into this 
topic can be a sometimes painful process of learning (or unlearning, as the case may be); I can 
attest to this in writing this thesis. This point is worth bearing in mind in regard to educators and 
students alike; it is important to keep a sense of balance around this topic and to make an effort to 
ensure that it does not become an exercise in hopelessness or despair. Such emotions are obviously 
counterproductive as they can result in a desire to stop learning or engaging with the topic. In 
recognition of this, many authors have discussed the importance of countering emotionally 
difficult material with learning experiences that are uplifting, positive, and hopeful, as well as ones 
that promote a sense of empowerment in students and a recognition that choices can be made that 
make a difference (e.g., Andrzejewski, 2003; Bell & Russell, 1999; Selby, 1995; Weil, 2004).
Perhaps keeping in mind that many positive outcomes can come from this sort of education 
helps to contextualize these difficulties. Learning about anthropocentrism can be deeply 
meaningful and even life-changing, and it can (re)connect students with a wider scope of life itself. 
It can broaden our ways of thinking, seeing, and being in the world, as well as our understandings 
of ourselves and the world around us—all excellent reasons, I think, for it to be incorporated into 
education.
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AFTERWORD
In this thesis I have aimed to explore and provide an introduction to the concept of 
anthropocentrism, as well as outline the connections I see between it and education. I hope by now 
I have made clear my argument that an engagement with the concept of anthropocentrism, along 
with the corollary study of human-animai relations, comprise important parts of an education 
concerned with fostering critical thinking, caring, and the development of a critical consciousness. 
Finally, I have attempted, through the last chapter, to outline some possible starting points for 
educational engagement with these ideas.
I realize I am by no means telling the whole story here. Much, much more could be said in 
each chapter of this thesis, and many of the ideas I have raised warrant a greater depth of 
exploration. I hope, however, to have made some level of contribution to the dialogue on 
anthropocentrism and education, and that my ideas maybe of some value to those interested in this 
topic. As I wrote in the introduction, this research is aimed at a wide audience, including students, 
teachers, philosophers, ethicists, and animal defense and social justice scholars and activists, as all 
of these groups, I think, have a stake in analyzing anthropocentrism. It is my hope that I have 
addressed the interests of these groups fairly and have outlined my ideas clearly, so that they may 
be of value to members of these groups.
A final stakeholder I see in relation to this work is the animals themselves, and while it is 
difficult to presume what their interests are, I hope to have represented them fairly while keeping 
intact their dignity and the value of their lives. I am a person who has always gravitated toward 
issues of social justice, and in the past five years animals have been at the forefront of my mind as 
a group worthy of inclusion, and highly in need of inclusion, on the social justice agenda. To that 
end, I hope to have made a positive contribution and presented a case for their inclusion in 
education.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
98
In considering animals, we are not taking away the relevance of humans and human 
concerns. We are not choosing one side over the other, but rather are expanding our framework 
altogether to see a wider, richer picture of life itself. Anthropocentrism rests on a divide between 
humans and animals and a presumption of human superiority, but by inquiring into that 
constructed divide, and by educating ourselves about it, I believe we can come to see its inherent 
falseness. This can only benefit us all, human and animal alike.
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